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THE UNEASY ENTENTE BETWEEN LEGAL
INSANITY AND MENS REA: BEYOND
CLARK V. ARIZONA
STEPHEN J. MORSE* & MORRIS B. HOFFMAN**
This Article considers the meaning and relation of legal insanity and mens
rea, using the Supreme Court's recent decision, Clark v. Arizona, which
addressed both, as the focus of discussion. It suggests that rules limiting
the introduction of evidence of mental disorder to negate mens rea are
unjust and that fair blame and punishment require retaining an insanity
defense. Alternatives to the insanity defense are rejected because they are
analytically unconvincing or unfair. The Article also addresses recent
challenges to the very possibility of criminal responsibility that are based
on new discoveries in neuroscience and behavioral science. It concludes
that these challenges are conceptually, empirically, and normatively
unjustified. Finally, it proposes that legal insanity cannot be consensually
defined morally or scientifically, but that the human capacityfor rationality
is the key to the normative debate about responsibility.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the affirmative defense of insanity took its first truly
modem breath in 1843 in M'Naghten's Case,1 its relationship to its cousin,
mens rea,2 has been plagued with confusion. How can one be "insane" yet
I (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.).
2

"Mens rea" is Latin for "guilty mind."

The phrase comes from the English legal

precept "Aetus non facit reum nisi mens rea sit" ["An act is not guilty unless the mind is
guilty"], which dates from at least the time of Henry I in the early 1 100s, and which was
likely based on the writings of St. Augustine. See generally Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens
Rea, 45 HARV. L. REv. 974, 974 (1932); Paul Robinson, Mens Rea, University of
Pennsylvania, Scholarship at Penn Law, Paper No. 35 (1999), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/35. Virtually every civilization that has left a relevant
record-including the Babylonians, Jews, Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans-recognized that
the law must judge both the act and the intention. See Max Radin, Intent, Criminal, in 8
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 126 (Edwin R. A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds.,

1932). This general rule had some strict liability exceptions, such as the common ancient
rule that a man was strictly liable for the acts of his slaves, and even a strict liability view of
homicide. See 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY

OF ENGLISH LAW 470-73 (2d ed. 1968). These exceptions did not displace the rule that even
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still have the mental state element required by the definition of a particular
crime? Can mens rea alone be a sufficient basis for a sensible theory of
criminal responsibility? Are there constitutional limits to a state's power to
eliminate or restrict the insanity defense or the mens rea requirement? May
states constitutionally preclude defense evidence directly relevant to
insanity or lack of mens rea? More generally, what impact should
recognized mental disorders have on criminal responsibility? Should
evolving ideas about the nature and causes of mental disorders and of
human behavior in general require changes in our settled views of
blameworthiness?
In Clark v. Arizona,3 the Supreme Court recently had one of its rare
opportunities to clarify some of these issues.4 The questions Clark
presented were whether Arizona's unusually narrow insanity defense test
violated the defendant's substantive due process rights and whether an
Arizona rule that excluded virtually all expert evidence concerning mental
disorder offered for the purpose of negating mens rea violated procedural
due process. 5 Alas, the decision clarified little and may in fact have further
muddied the conceptual and practical waters.6
in ancient times civilized people cared both about the wrongdoer's acts and his intentions.
Indeed, the notion that punishable crimes must be non-accidental appears to be a human
universal. See infra text accompanying note 185. But see Guyora Binder, The New
Culpability: Motive, Character,and Emotion in Criminal Law, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 15
(2002) ("[T]he supposedly ancient conception of mens rea ... is really a modem polemical
construct.").
3 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006).
4 Throughout its history, the Court has decided only a handful of cases dealing with
broad concepts of criminal responsibility, a reticence that reflects the institutional
presumption that these questions are largely for the states to decide. See infra text
accompanying note 12. Clark was the Court's first case dealing directly with insanity or the
general question of mens rea since 1996. See discussion of Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S.
37 (1996), infra in the text accompanying notes 36-48. There were mental state cases
decided by the Court in the period between Egelhoff and Clark, but they all dealt either with
collateral issues or with a specific type of mens rea. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005) (holding that execution of person who committed capital murder prior to
eighteen years of age violates Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(holding that execution of mentally retarded defendant violates Eighth Amendment); Kansas
v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (addressing constitutional limits on states' civil commitment
powers); Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999) (holding that the intent requirement
of federal car-jacking statute satisfied by defendant's "conditional intent" to harm driver if
necessary); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (addressing constitutional limits on
states' civil commitment powers).
5 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2716.
6 See Ronald J. Allen, Clark v. Arizona: Much (Confused) Ado About Nothing, 4 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 135 (2006); Peter Westen, The Supreme Court's Bout with Insanity: Clark v.
Arizona, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143 (2006). Professors Allen and Westen characterize the
issues in Clark differently than this Article--especially Professor Allen, who thinks that the
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To lay the foundation for understanding Clark, in Parts II and III we
first examine the law of criminal responsibility, including its constitutional
dimensions, and then explore the relevance of mental disorder to wellsettled principles of criminal responsibility, such as the formation of mens
rea and the criteria for the defense of insanity. Part IV considers Clark in
detail. Part V addresses the constitutionality and wisdom of abolishing
either the requirement of mens rea or the defense of legal insanity. Part VI
considers the future of these two doctrines, both of which, we contend, are
central to preserving just and sensible principles of blameworthiness. We
conclude that contemporary scientific approaches to understanding human
behavior do not undermine these principles and our legal practices based on
them.
II. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CONSTITUTION

The structure of criminal responsibility is superficially straightforward.
Crimes are defined by their "elements," which always include a prohibited
act and in most cases a mental state, a mens rea, such as intent. The
Constitution's Due Process Clause has been construed to require that the
prosecution must prove all the elements defining a criminal offense beyond
a reasonable doubt.7 Even if the state can prove all the elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, the defendant may avoid criminal liability by establishing
an affirmative defense of justification or excuse. 8 The Due Process Clause
has been interpreted to permit a state to place the burden of persuasion for
affirmative defenses on either the prosecution or the defense. 9
opinion concerns a simple issue of evidence-but both agree that the opinion failed to clarify
legal insanity, mens rea, and the relation between them.
7 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."); see also Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (noting jury instruction shifting burden of persuasion on a
mental state element to defendant violates due process).
8 The border between justification and excuse can be hazy. See Kent Greenawalt, The
Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 (1984).
Nevertheless, the distinction between clear cases may be stated as follows: conduct that
would otherwise be criminal is justified if it is right or at least permissible under the specific
circumstances. Self-defense is the classic example. Conduct is excused, even if it is
wrongful, if the defendant was not responsible for the conduct. Infancy and legal insanity
are classic examples.
9 See Dixon v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2437 (2006) (permitting placing burden of
persuasion for duress on defendant); Martin v. Ohio 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (permitting placing
of burden of persuasion for self-defense on defendant); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790
(1952) (permitting placing burden of persuasion for legal insanity on defendant). It appears
that a jurisdiction may place the burden of persuasion on the defendant at any level it wishes,
ranging from a preponderance of the evidence to beyond a reasonable doubt. In most cases,
however, jurisdictions that shift the burden of persuasion to the defense require that the
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Persistent confusion about the meaning of mens rea, as well as deep
and complex constitutional issues, cloud this facially straightforward
account of criminal responsibility. First, let us clarify some terminological
confusion. In its narrow sense, mens rea refers to the specific mental state
or states required by the definition of all crimes other than strict liability
crimes.'l
The state must prove these definitional elements beyond a
reasonable doubt. Mens rea in this sense is absent, and the defendant must
be acquitted of a crime requiring such a mens rea, if the defendant is able to
cast a reasonable doubt on whether the mental state was formed in fact.
"Mens rea" is also sometimes used more broadly to refer generally to
criminal liability, responsibility, blameworthiness, or culpability. In these
senses, it refers to the situation in which the prosecution is able to prove all
the definitional elements beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant fails
to establish an affirmative defense."' Under these conditions, the defendant
is ultimately blameworthy or criminally responsible. The defendant can
avoid mens rea in this broader sense, defeating any criminal
blameworthiness, either by negating any element of the crime charged or by
establishing an affirmative defense. In the remainder of this Article, we
will use the term mens rea in the narrower sense-the specific mental state
element required by the definition of the crime.
Defining crimes is a quintessential right of states, 12 but many crimes
have significant common law, and indeed pre-common law,' 3 roots preThis raises the central
dating the settlements in the Constitution.
constitutional question about crime: are there constitutional limitations on a
state's right to define crimes grounded in common law principles codified

defense be proven by a preponderance of the evidence or by the "intermediate" clear and
convincing evidence standard. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000) (placing the burden of proof
on defendants in federal trials to prove legal insanity by clear and convincing evidence).
10In their influential casebook, Sanford Kadish, Stephen Schulhofer, and Carol Steiker
refer to this usage as mens rea in its "narrow" sense. SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER & CAROL STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS

213-14 (8th ed. 2007).
11Kadisb, Schulhofer, and Steiker refer to this usage as mens rea in the "broader" sense.
Id. at 213-14. We use the admittedly vague locution "establish an affirmative defense,"
recognizing that the burden of persuasion may be placed on either the prosecution or the
defense.
12See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232 (1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
201-02 (1977). Indeed, there was little substantive federal criminal law until the early
1900s. See Frank 0. Bowman III, Fearof Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 313-14 (2000).
13See infra text accompanying notes 305-10 for a discussion of the biological roots of
the criminal law in general and of notions of blameworthiness in particular.
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in the Constitution, either expressly or, more fruitfully, implicitly in the
doctrine of substantive due process?14
15
In Robinson v. California,
the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibited punishing a person for being an addict. The Justices disagreed
substantially about the rationale for the holding, and there was no single
opinion for the Court. The plurality opinion was replete, however, with
suggestions that criminalizing and punishing the status of being an addict is
6
unconstitutional because that status is beyond the control of the addict.'
The Robinson Court did not explain how the taking of illegal drugs by an
addict-which it took great pains to admit could be criminalized by the
state-is any more within the addict's control than the status of being an
addict.
Six years later, the Court stepped back from the precipice of
constitutionalizing "loss of control" in Powell v. Texas, 17 which held that
the Constitution does not prevent a state from criminalizing public
drunkenness, even when the target of the prosecution is suffering from the
"disease" of chronic alcoholism and is thus allegedly powerless to control
his behavior. Although Justice Marshall's plurality opinion in Powell has
been read narrowly as simply an unwillingness to extend Robinson from the
impermissibility of punishing a status to the impermissibility of punishing
allegedly uncontrollable acts, the opinion signaled more broadly that the
Court considered the doctrines of criminal responsibility firmly within the
discretion of the states. It said it was loathe "under the aegis of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause" to become "the ultimate arbiter of the
standards of criminal responsibility."' 18 Justice Marshall explained:

14This presupposes another constitutional question, one that is beyond the scope of this
article: whether the whole idea of "substantive due process" is legitimate. Compare Mays v.
City of East St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1001 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J.) ("[S]ubstantive
due process is an oxymoron."), ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE

240 (1990) (arguing there is little textual or historical
support for the idea of substantive due process), and John Harrison, Substantive Due Process
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW

and the ConstitutionalText, 83 VA. L. REv. 493, 495 (1997) (same), with Toni M. Massaro,
Reviving Hugo Black? The Court's "Jot"for "Jot"Account of Substantive Due Process, 73
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1086, 1091-92 (1998) (arguing that the Court should read the notion of
substantive due process even more broadly), and Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round
Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 833, 892 (2003) (same).
1"370 U.S. 660 (1962).
16As Justice Stewart put it, drug addiction "is an illness which may be contracted
innocently or involuntarily," and that imprisonment for such a status inflicts cruel and
unusual punishment as surely as if the defendant were being imprisoned "for the 'crime' of
having a common cold." Id. at 667.
17 392 U.S. 514, 534-37 (1968).

18Id. at 537-55 (Black & Harlan, JJ., concurring).
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We cannot cast aside the centuries-long evolution of the collection of interlocking
and overlapping concepts which the common law has utilized to assess the moral
accountability of an individual for his antisocial deeds. The doctrines of actus reus,
mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have historically provided the
tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of
the criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of
the nature of man. This
19 process of adjustment has always been thought to be the
province of the States.

It is difficult to imagine a clearer, more straightforward expression of
deference to the states concerning the definitions of crimes and defenses.
Yet, beginning in 1975, the Court decided a series of cases that vacillated
on the question of the constitutional limits on a state's freedom to define
crimes and defenses and the concomitant power to allocate criminal burdens
of proof.
In Mullaney v. Wilbur,20 the Court considered the constitutionality of
Maine's rather unique burden-shifting murder statute. Maine included
"malice" as one of the elements of murder, but defined it to exclude killings
committed in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation. 21 Even though
malice so defined was an element of the crime-an element the prosecution
had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt-the Maine statute imposed the
burden of proving provocation/passion on the defendant. This shifting of
the burden of proof clearly violated Winship's requirement that the state
must prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the Court had little trouble striking down the statute on that basis. The
opinion also contained stunning language, however, that seemed to suggest
that Winship applied to any fact bearing on the defendant's "degree of
criminal culpability,, 23 whether or not it was among the elements of the
crime.24 It appeared that the Supreme Court was taking a tentative further
step toward constitutionalizing substantive criminal law.
The imagined turn toward a more intrusive federal role in the
substantive criminal law proved just that-imagined. Two years after the
controversial dictum in Mullaney, the Court returned to Powell's more

at 535-36.
20 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
21Id. at 688.
19 Id.

22 Id.

698.
24 This definitional tension between elemental facts and non-elemental facts should have
23 Id. at

a familiar ring. That same distinction has been the object of the Court's recent and
controversial attention in the context of the Sixth Amendment in the so-called Apprendi line
of cases, culminating in the Court's striking down of the federal sentencing guidelines in
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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restrained approach in Patterson v. New York, 5 which addressed a New
York statute that was functionally equivalent to the Maine statute
considered in Mullaney. To reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter,
New York had adopted the Model Penal Code's "extreme emotional
disturbance" test. 26 This doctrine was meant to serve the same partially

mitigating function as the provocation/passion formula, but it provided a
broader test that was allegedly more consistent with modem understanding
of behavior and that better tracked culpability. Unlike Maine, however,
New York explicitly treated this doctrine as a partial affirmative defense
and placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant.
Although "extreme emotional disturbance" is as relevant to the degree
of a defendant's culpability as "heat of passion," the Court rejected a broad
reading of Mullaney that would have required the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact bearing on culpability, and instead gave
determinative weight to New York's decision to treat emotional disturbance
as a partial affirmative defense:
[E]ven if we were to hold that a State must prove sanity to convict once that fact is put
in issue [a position the Court rejected], it would not necessarily follow that a State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the existence or nonexistence of
which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating
circumstance affecting
27
the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment.

The Court strongly reiterated that states have extensive discretion to define
crimes and defenses as they wish and to allocate the burden of persuasion
accordingly:
If the State... chooses to recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of criminality or
punishment, we think the State may assure itself that the fact has been established
with reasonable certainty. To recognize at all a mitigating circumstance does not
require the State to prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in
issue, if in28 its judgment this would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too
inaccurate.

The Patterson Court did recognize that there were constitutional limits
to the state's ability to redefine at least some elements as affirmative
defenses and thus to shift the burden of persuasion, but the examples it
gave-such as a legislature declaring a person presumptively guilty of a

25 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
26 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(l)(a)-(b) (1962).
27 Patterson,432 U.S. at 207.
28 Id. at 209.
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crime 29-seemed to place little, if any, effective limit on the state's
discretion.3 °
Patterson did not explicitly overrule Mullaney, but it seemed
inconsistent with it, and that apparent inconsistency created an industry of
commentary. 3' Indeed, the two cases together spawned
an enormous debate
' 32
between the "substantivists" and "proceduralists.
Substantivists believed that Mullaney was correctly decided, that
Patterson threatened to erode Winship's protections, and that states could
not, by the mere artifice of re-labeling an element as an affirmative defense,
relieve the state of its burden of proof on the definitional elements.33 For
example, imagine a homicide statute that defined "intentional action that
caused the death of a human being" as first degree murder and then forced
the defendant to prove as affirmative defenses that the defendant did not
intend to cause death (reducing the grade to second degree murder), was not
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death (reducing the grade to
manslaughter), and should not have been aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of death (acquittal).34 In such a situation, Winship's
protection of liberty would be largely illusory.
In contrast, the proceduralists thought that, as a matter of constitutional
law if not of policy, the states have virtually limitless discretion to re-label
traditional elemental facts as affirmative defenses.3 5 Indeed, that very
decision-whether a fact should be an element for which the state has the
burden of proof or an affirmative defense that the defendant might be
Id. at 210.
30 See Westen, supra note 6, at 161 (claiming that because the distribution of elements
29

and defenses is entirely malleable, depending on how states define crimes and defenses, the
constitutional rules concerning burden of persuasion are themselves malleable).
31 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A
Unified ConstitutionalApproach to EvidentiaryDevices, 94 HARV. L. REv. 321 (1980).
32 Larry Alexander describes the debate. Larry Alexander, The Supreme Court, Dr.
Jekyll, and the Due Process of Proof 1996 SuP. CT. REv. 191, 193-96.
33 See id.
34 Such a statute would of course raise constitutional eyebrows after Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), in which the Court expressed distaste for strict liability applied
to core, common law offenses. Nonetheless, Morissette was not constitutionally-based and it
is still an open question whether a legislature can choose to make any crime a strict liability
crime as long as it makes clear that it intends to do so for good reason. One of us (Hoffman)
has discussed an even more extreme case of re-labeling elements as non-elements, albeit in
the context of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that the state must
charge and prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact other than prior criminal record that
will have the effect of increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum):
Could a state define all crimes as having a single element (intending to harm another person)
and then change all other elements to sentencing factors? Morris B. Hoffman, The Casefor
Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 984 n. 127 (2003).
35 See Alexander, supra note 32.
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required to prove-is precisely the kind of policy decision the
proceduralists believed cases like Powell and Patterson properly placed
within the state's judgment.
In Montana v. Egelhoff36 which was the last important general mens
rea case decided before Clark, the Court addressed these issues, but in a
context different from re-labeling elements as affirmative defenses. The
question answered by Egelhoff was whether, and under what conditions, the
State may constitutionally bar a defendant from introducing relevant and
reliable evidence for the purpose of negating an element.37 Egelhoff was
charged with first degree murder under a Montana homicide statute that
defined the crime as requiring purpose or knowledge.3 8 Egelhoff sought to
negate the inference of intent arising from strong physical evidence
consistent with the formation of an intent to kill by introducing evidence of
his incontrovertibly extreme intoxication at the time of the crime. 39 The
intoxication evidence was his only plausible means to negate intent, but the
evidence of intoxication was excluded from the jury under a Montana
statute that specifically barred the use of evidence of voluntary intoxication
to negate mens rea.4 °
The Supreme Court held that such exclusion did not violate the
defendant's due process rights. 41 The Justices disagreed about whether the
Montana statute was an evidentiary rule or a redefinition of the offense of
murder.4 2 All nine Justices agreed, however, that states had substantial
discretion to define crimes. As Justice Ginsburg said in her concurrence,
citing Powell, "States enjoy wide latitude in defining the elements of
criminal offenses, particularly when determining 'the extent to which moral

36 518 U.S. 37 (1996).

37 id.

31Id.at 40-41.
39 Id.at 41.

§ 45-2-203 (1995).
Egelhoff,518 U.S. at 56.
42 Justice Scalia's plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Thomas, endorsed concurring Justice Ginsburg's view that Montana's statute
"embodies a legislative judgment regarding the circumstances under which individuals may
be held criminally responsible for their actions," but Justice Scalia nonetheless analyzed the
statute as an evidentiary rule because that was how the Supreme Court of Montana chose to
analyze it. Id. at 50 n.4. In dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that Montana's statute was a
rule of evidence. Id.at 71-73. Justice Souter accepted Montana's own interpretation of the
statute as a rule of evidence, but suggested that the statute had implicitly redefined the
elements of the crime. Id. at 73. Justices Breyer and Stevens also joined Justice O'Connor
in considering themselves bound by the Montana Supreme Court's interpretation, but argued
that the statute created anomalies and made guilt turn upon irrelevant external circumstances
rather than the defendant's state of mind. Id. at 79.
40 MONT. CODE ANN.
41
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culpability should be a prerequisite to conviction of a crime."' 43 Moreover,
all nine Justices agreed that a criminal defendant does not have an absolute
right to present evidence relevant to his defense.
Justice Scalia began the plurality opinion by noting that there was no
indication in historical practice that the use of voluntary intoxication
evidence to negate mens rea was so entrenched that it was a "fundamental
principle of justice.",44 He continued by arguing that the defendant's right to
introduce even "crucial" and reliable evidence was not absolute and could
yield to "valid state justifications" that might support exclusion.4 5 One
might of course take issue with some or all of these justifications, but these
kinds of policy decisions are precisely the kinds of decisions arguably left
to state legislatures.46
The plurality also made short work of Egelhoff s argument that the
Montana rule violated Winship. Justice Scalia reasoned that Montana's rule
did not shift the burden of persuasion, but by excluding intoxication
evidence simply made it easier for Montana to prove mens rea beyond a

43 Id. at 58 (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 545 (1968)) (Black, J., concurring).
44 An argument could be made that the older authorities, such as Hale, Blackstone, and
Story, failed adequately to distinguish between the two senses of mens rea described in
supra notes 10-11, and that they were referring to the broader sense in rejecting an
intoxication defense. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia was correct about the practice in the states.
At most, there was a trend in favor of introducing such evidence, albeit almost always with
limitations. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 37.
45 Justice Scalia posited several such justifications. First, a state might wish to deter
intoxication itself by holding drunken defendants strictly liable for all consequences that
occur, even if they lacked mens rea for the aggravated results. Second, the rule operates as a
specific deterrent by imprisoning people who cannot control their violent conduct while
intoxicated. Third, the rule reflects society's moral perception that a defendant who
voluntarily impaired his own faculties should be held strictly accountable for the
consequences. Finally, intoxication evidence may be misleading because there is evidence
that culture rather than pharmacology largely explains the connection between crime and
intoxication. Jurors who have been led to believe the opposite will be too quick to conclude
that intoxicated defendants were "biologically incapable" of forming mens rea. Id. at 41-51.
46 Justice O'Connor's dissent focused on the "'fundamental principle' that a defendant
has ... a fair opportunity to put forward his defense." Id. at 71. She argued that it was
fundamentally unfair to prevent the defendant from mounting a full defense with relevant
evidence that alone could exonerate him, without close examination of competing state
interests, an examination she found wanting. Id. at 72-73. For example, Montana allowed
evidence of involuntary intoxication to be used to negate mens rea, a rule arguably
inconsistent with the claim that intoxication evidence misleads jurors about the formation of
mens rea. The dissent also noted that Justice Scalia's policy reasons were not articulated by
Montana, either in legislative history or even in the briefs. Id. at 66-67. Montana had
instead argued that the "sole purpose" for disallowance was "to keep from the jury's
consideration a category of evidence that helps the defendant's case and weakens the
government's case." Id. at 68.
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reasonable doubt, an effect that any evidentiary rule might produce.47 Such
burden-reducing evidentiary rules are constitutionally permissible unless
they themselves violate a fundamental principle of fairness, which, Justice
Scalia had already concluded, Montana's rule did not.48
This was the state of the law until the Court had its chance to speak
again in Clark. Before we address that opinion, we first briefly consider the
concept of mental disorder, and then review in some depth well-settled
principles of criminal responsibility and the relevance of mental disorder to
those principles.
III. MENTAL DISORDER AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

What is a "mental disorder" and what is its potential relevance to
whether a person suffering from it acted, possessed a requisite mens rea, or
qualified for a mitigating or excusing condition such as legal insanity? 49 To

answer these questions requires more detail about the nature of recognized
mental disorders and the law's criteria for act, mens rea, and legal insanity.
A. MENTAL DISORDER

There is no consensus-philosophically or scientifically-on the
definition of "mental disorder." That lack of consensus should hardly
surprise us. "Disorder" and "order," abnormality and normality, are
normative terms applied to behavior that science cannot independently
define and that therefore inevitably lead to disagreement. They implicate
many difficult empirical and theoretical questions that are relevant to our
argument, but are largely beyond its scope. We will later have occasion to
examine some of these questions, but for now let us focus on the current
scientific and clinical orthodoxy about mental disorder.
Probably the most widely used definition in the United States, and
perhaps in the world, is contained in the American Psychiatric
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.5 °
This document admits, however, that "no definition adequately specifies
precise boundaries for the concept of 'mental disorder,' 51 and that its

47 Id. at 55 (plurality opinion).
41 Id. at 41-51.

49 For purposes of this Article, we limit discussion of excuses to legal insanity, but
mental disorder might also be relevant to other excuses depending on how the other excuse
doctrines are interpreted.
50 AM.

PSYCHIATRIC

ASS'N,

DIAGNOSTIC

AND

STATISTICAL MANUAL

OF MENTAL

DISORDERS, 4TH EDITION-TEXT REVISION XXX-XXXi (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]

(providing a definition).
"' Id. at xxx.
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definition has been subjected to substantial criticism. 52 The Supreme Court
has repeatedly and opportunistically used this disagreement to justify
outcomes as disparate as requiring an intermediate, "clear and convincing
53
evidence" burden of proof in involuntary civil commitment cases,
rejecting a constitutionalized control test for criminal responsibility,54 and
upholding the constitutionality of an especially onerous form of involuntary
commitment for so-called mentally abnormal, sexually violent predators. 55
As we shall see in the next Part, they again use this conclusion to support
their argument in Clark.56
Nevertheless, there is substantial agreement that some behavior,
especially behavior indicative primarily of a loss of the capacity for
rationality, should be considered the product of a biological or
psychological defect. For example, most observers agree that a gross and
substantial loss of touch with reality qualifies as a severe abnormality.
Indeed, there are special legal rules for the differential treatment of people
with such abnormalities in most areas of civil and criminal law. 57 Within
the latter, for example, in addition to doctrines concerning criminal
responsibility, there are doctrines concerning competence to plead guilty,
competence to stand trial, competence to be sentenced, and competence to
be executed.
There are many open conceptual and empirical questions about mental
disorders, but the law routinely deals with cases involving people who
suffer from them. One way to think about the difficult questions about
mental state and blameworthiness is to analogize them to electricity.
52See, e.g., Jerome C. Wakefield, Disorder as Harmful Dysfunction: A Conceptual
Critique of DSM-II1-R's Definition of Mental Disorder, 99 PSYCH. REV. 232 (1993)

(offering critique of same definition used in DSM-IV-TR). See generally PETER

CONRAD,
THE MEDICALIZATION OF SOCIETY: ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN CONDITIONS INTO
TREATABLE DISORDERS 46-69 (2007) (using ADHD as an example of the easy expansion and

fluidity of psychiatric diagnoses); ALLAN V. HORWITZ & JEROME C. WAKEFIELD, THE Loss
OF SADNESS: How PSYCHIATRY TRANSFORMED NORMAL SORROW INTO DEPRESSIVE DISORDER

(2007) (offering an extensive conceptual and empirical analysis and critique of current
diagnostic criteria and practice using the diagnosis of depression as a case study and offering
an evolutionary approach to ameliorate existing definitional problems). In his introduction
to the Horwitz and Wakefield book, the primary author of the current DSM approach, Dr.
Robert L. Spitzer, concedes that the book's critique has caused him to rethink his own
position. ROBERT L. SPITZER, Forewardto HORWITZ & WAKEFIELD, supra,at viii-ix (terming
the argument concerning depression "devastating").
53 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979).
54 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968).
55 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997).
56 See infra text accompanying notes 162-65.
57 See Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 189, 193 (1999)
[hereinafter Morse, Crazy Reasons].
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Modem physics has exposed the foundations of the elemental particles,
including the electron, as a kind of mysterious expression of a set of strange
and counter-intuitive physical rules; in some ways it seems the more we
learn about quantum physics the more our macro-reality seems to be an
illusion. Yet those foundational uncertainties hardly disable us from using
electricity, or designing circuits.
Healthy skepticism about mental disorder and the potential relation
between it and criminal responsibility, especially in marginal cases, is
warranted; outright rejection is not.
B. THE ACT DOCTRINE
An intentional act is crucial to the definition of any conduct we wish to
criminalize. Indeed, our very use of the word "conduct" in the last sentence
conveys the notion that acts, not mere thoughts or desires, are the domain of
crime. Although thoughts and desires can be intentionally produced, and
can be evaluated morally, 58 we do not criminalize these mental states
because by themselves they do no harm, and the reach of the criminal law is
defined in large measure by the harm principle.59
Moreover, the
requirement of an act before blame and punishment may be imposed
appears to have constitutional status.6 ° On the other hand, harms or
threatened harms, all of which result from actual or potential body
movements or intentional lack of movement, cannot be attributed to the
agent as an agent unless those movements or lack of motion are intentional.
Spasms and reflexes, for example, can cause or risk harm, but in most cases
we do not hold the agent responsible for them. The challenge for the law is
how to define a "voluntary" or "intentional" act (or omission in cases in
which the agent has a duty to act) in a sensible and useful way.
The criminal law's evolving answer has never been entirely
satisfactory. Indeed, some have resorted to defining a criminally cognizable
"act" by what it is not. 6 1 Nonetheless, as with the notion of "mental state,"
the law has managed to develop a useful working definition: an "act" for
purposes of the criminal law is an intentional bodily movement (or
intentional inaction) performed in a state of reasonably integrated

58

Merely coveting

one's neighbor's

wife,

for example, violates the Tenth

Commandment. Exodus 20:17; Deuteronomy 5:21.
59 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW

1-64

(1984).
60 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
61 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2) (1962) (defining reflexes and sleepwalking,
inter alia, as not actions).
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consciousness. 62 "Intentional" in this definition means that the agent's
bodily movement is at least potentially rationalizable as having been
performed for a reason.
Mental disorder seldom interferes with an agent's ability to act
intentionally, even though in infrequent cases it may cloud consciousness.
For example, depersonalization and less severe delirium can compromise
consciousness without rendering the person's movements non-actions. 63 It
is only at the extreme, when consciousness is substantially or completely
obliterated, that the law will acquit the defendant because action was
lacking. Sleepwalking is a classic example.64 There is a debate about
whether apparently environmentally responsive, goal-directed behavior
65
performed with clouded consciousness should be considered action or not,
but criminal behavior performed in such states either negates the action
requirement of the prima facie case or it satisfies the criteria for the
affirmative defense of automatism.66 Sufficiently clouded consciousness as
a result of mental disorder might thus defeat criminal responsibility, but,
again, these cases are rare.
C. MENS REA
As Justice Holmes famously observed, "Even a dog distinguishes
between being stumbled over and being kicked. 6 7 Mens rea is considered
the royal road to the assessment of culpability because it indicates the
agent's attitude towards the rights and interests of his fellow citizens when

62

Alas, sufficiently integrated consciousness is also typically described by negative

criteria. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (e.g., sleepwalking is not action).
63 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 50, at 135-41 (explaining that the point prevalence for
delirium is marked by a disturbance of consciousness; point prevalence for in adults under
the age of 55 is .4%); id. at 530-32 (Depersonalization Disorder is marked by episodes of
detachment or estrangement from one's self or feelings of being an automaton). Many other
disorders can also cause consciousness clouding although such clouding is not a crucial
diagnostic criterion.
64 Id. at 639-44 (describing sleepwalking disorder); see also Fain v. Commonwealth, 39
Am. Rep. 213 (Ky. App. Ct. 1879).
65 See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME 49-52, 135-55, 257-58
(1993) (arguing
that cases of compromised consciousness should be treated as non-action); Michael S.
Moore, More on Act and Crime, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1749, 1804-20 (1994) (same); Stephen J.
Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1641-52 (1994) (arguing that
clouded consciousness should be treated as an affirmative defense). See generally Bernard
Williams, The Actus Reus of Dr. Caligari, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1661 (1994) (asserting that
clouded consciousness should be treated as action).
66 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 466-71 (4th ed. 2003).
67 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (Dover ed., Dover Publ'ns, Inc.
1991) (1881).
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an agent harms or threatens them. As Justice Jackson wrote in Morissette v.
United States,
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention
is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems
of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil. A relation between some mental
element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's
familiar exculpatory "But I didn't mean to"....68

Intentional body movements may cause harms, but if the defendant has
been acting as carefully as we can expect a morally well-constituted agent
to act under the circumstances, we conclude that the agent has done nothing
wrong, civilly or criminally. His behavior has shown all the respect for the
rights of others that we demand. Accidents happen that are no one's fault.
Similarly, an agent who harms another on purpose is more blameworthy
and deserves more punishment than an agent who causes precisely the same
harm, but does so unaware that his unreasonable conduct was placing the
victim at substantial risk of incurring that harm. The disregard of the
former for the rights of his victims is total; the disregard of the latter is
serious, but less so. Mens rea is crucial to defining fault and justifying
punishment.
Over the centuries, the criminal law has developed a very large number
of mens rea terms to mark such differences in culpability. Modem codes
have attempted to streamline the mens rea vocabulary. The Model Penal
Code, for example, has consolidated mens rea to four terms.6 9
Nevertheless, the common law process of interpretation continues as courts
struggle to find more accurate methods to evaluate blameworthiness.
With rare exception, mens rea terms, such as intent or knowledge, have
their ordinary, non-technical meanings. For example, intent does not
require any level of commitment to the agent's goal or any degree of moral
evaluation. 0 Intent simply means that the agent did something on purpose.
68 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952) (footnote omitted).

69 Those four levels of culpability, in order of decreasing blameworthiness, are: purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES, PART I

§ 2.02(2) (1985). Several scholars have argued that these apparently distinct levels of
culpability are in fact indistinguishable from one another, at least at their margins. See, e.g.,
Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88
CAL. L. REV. 931 (2000); Kimberley K. Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 597 (2001); Douglas N. Hasak & Craig A. Callender, Willful Ignorance,
Knowledge, and the "Equal Culpability" Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the
Principle of Legality, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 29 (1994); Morris B. Hoffman, Booker,
Pragmatism,and the MoralJury, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 455, 473-74 (2005).
70 See KADISH ET AL., supra note 10, at 213. There are some exceptions. Premeditation,

which is used in some jurisdictions as a criterion for the most serious form of intentional
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Even where a mens rea term is legal jargon, such as "recklessness," its
criteria-conscious awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk-have
traditional meanings. To determine if mental disorder negates mens rea,
one must simply ask, using straightforward common sense to provide an
answer, if the defendant's disordered mental state actually indicates that
mens rea was not formed on the occasion.
Doctrines that permit defendants to present mental disorder evidence
to negate mens rea are often misleadingly termed "diminished capacity,"
suggesting that these doctrines are some kind of mitigation or partial
excuse. This is incorrect. They refer to a straightforward denial of a
requisite element, akin to a denial that one acted or to a mistake of fact.71
They are not a lesser form of the insanity defense. The failure to recognize
this clear distinction often produces faulty reasoning about whether a
defendant should be permitted to introduce mental disorder evidence to
negate mens rea because courts wrongly believe the defendant is requesting
the court to create a "mini" insanity defense.7 2
Mental disorders relevant to mens rea most frequently produce
disordered cognition, such as hallucinations or delusions, or untoward,
sometimes strong, desires, such as the desire to have sexual relations with
minors or the desire to set fires or to take controlled substances. In other
words, mental disorder produces crazy desires or crazy beliefs about reality,
but it virtually never prevents a defendant from meeting the law's criteria
73
for intention, knowledge, conscious awareness, and other mens rea terms.
Likewise, mental disorder seldom disables a defendant from having
the capacity to form a mens rea. 4 Modem inquiries into state of mind, both
academic and judicial, seem obsessed with the vexed question of whether a
defendant had the capacity to form mens rea, but either a defendant had the
requisite mens rea or he did not. Mental disorder may in some cases
demonstrate that the defendant did not form the mens rea at the time of the
crime. Not having a mens rea or having a mental state inconsistent with the
requisite mens rea does not mean, however, that someone was incapable of
murder, under some interpretations may include the requirement of a particularly rational or
even morally evaluative process of preconsideration before committing intentional homicide.
Negligence standards employing a "reasonableness" test of course require normative
judgment about whether behavior is reasonable.
71 Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM.
L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1,6 (1984).

72See, e.g., Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64 (D.C. 1976). The Arizona case the
Supreme Court considers in Clark makes precisely this error. State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046,
1050-51 (Ariz. 1997). Indeed, as we shall see, the Clark majority itself blurs the two
doctrines. See infra Part IV.B.
73 See Morse, Crazy Reasons, supra note 57, at 197-98.
74 Morse, supra note 71, at 42.
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forming it. If an agent lacks the capacity to do something, it follows that
the agent did not do it in fact. Thus, evidence about the defendant's
capacity to form a mens rea is logically and factually relevant to whether it
was actually formed.
Asking about a defendant's capacity to form a mental state never
provides better information than inquiring directly whether the mens rea
was formed in fact, which is the ultimate legal question. Resolving
questions about capacity requires a counterfactual inquiry that we lack the
clinical and scientific resources to answer. When an expert testifies that a
defendant lacked the capacity to form a mens rea, that opinion seldom has a
clinical or scientific basis. It was precisely these types of difficulties that
led California to bar testimony about the defendant's capacity to form a
mens rea, although it did permit testimony about whether the mental state
was formed in fact.75
Consider the Model Penal Code's example of a hallucinating killer
who strangles a victim believing that he is squeezing a lemon.7 6 Believing
that you are squeezing a lemon is flatly inconsistent with believing that you
are squeezing someone's throat for the purpose of killing the victim. What
does it mean to ask whether such a person had the capacity to form the
intent to kill? How do we interpret this question?
One possibility is that we are asking whether the person could have
formed an intent to kill if he believed that he was squeezing a person's
throat-whether, that is, he had the general capacity to form an intent to kill
a person. This requires a speculative answer, but the answer is probably
"yes," because most people have the general capacity to form all species of
intents, including an intent to kill.
The second possible interpretation is that we are asking whether at the
precise moment that a person believes he is squeezing a lemon, he is also
capable of forming an intent to kill the object he is squeezing. The answer
to this second question is "no," because one cannot at precisely the same
moment form two different and inconsistent mental states. This is
tautologically and trivially true. But this interpretation shows that we are
not really considering the defendant's capacities at all. The reason we
know that he "lacked the capacity" to form the intent to kill at that precise
moment is because he in fact formed another mental state. Our knowledge
of this temporally specific form of "incapacity" is doing no explanatory

75 CAL. PENAL CODE § 28 (1998).
76 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES

§ 4.01 at 166 (1985). This example is silly

because mental disorder does not work this way; it does not produce such beliefs.
Nevertheless, the virtue of the example is that it is clear.
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work. We conclude that incapacity existed because we know ex post that
another mental state was in fact formed.
So far, the discussion of capacity has assumed that we incontrovertibly
know what mental state the defendant in fact formed. In the real world of
criminal law, however, mental state must be proved by the prosecution, and
is often countered by defense evidence. To continue the lemon example,
imagine that there was good evidence to suggest that the defendant
sporadically hallucinated that non-lemons were in fact lemons, but it is not
clear whether he was suffering from that hallucination when he strangled
his victim. He claims that he was, but there was also evidence of bad blood
between him and the victim. 77 Perhaps he is lying, or he is so distraught
about committing homicide that he has unwittingly and incorrectly
convinced himself that he was hallucinating.
We can confidently conclude that he probably lacked the capacity to
believe that the victim was not the small yellow citrus fruit only if we are
equally confident that he almost always hallucinates that people are lemons.
Again, our conclusion about capacity would be based on what mental states
had been formed in fact rather than based on our direct and independent
evidence about the person's capacities. The mental states of people with
mental disorder, like those of people without disorder, are often variable,
however, and speculation about capacity on a particular occasion will be of
little help.
For all of these reasons, evidence of mental disorder allegedly relevant
to a person's capacity to form a mental state will almost never help resolve
whether that state was formed in fact.
The examples of Daniel M'Naghten and Andrea Yates will help
demonstrate that even the most delusional or hallucinating person can form
the requisite mental state. M'Naghten delusionally believed that there was
a conspiratorial Tory plot to kill him, and formed a preemptive plan to kill
the Tory Prime Minister, Robert Peel.78 When he shot and killed Peel's
secretary, Drummond, believing the secretary was Peel, he surely intended
to kill a person. 79 Likewise, Andrea Yates believed that unless she killed
her children, they would become corrupt and would be tormented by Satan

77 This was almost precisely the situation in Clark. There was no doubt Clark was

suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, but there was considerable doubt about whether his
delusions really interfered with his ability to intend to kill a policeman. Just days prior to the
incident, he had bragged to his friends about wanting to kill policemen. See infra text
accompanying notes 111-20.
78 RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF DANIEL

MCNAUGHTAN 10 (1981).
79 M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.).
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for eternity. 8 She therefore decided to kill her children.8' She knew they
were human beings and that human beings are killed by drowning. Ms.
Yates surely intended to kill the five children when she drowned them in
the bathtub. Likewise, a person suffering from auditory hallucinations who
hears God's voice command him to kill surely forms the intention to kill
when he kills in response to the hallucinated command.
Admittedly, on rare occasions, psychotic mentation is genuinely
inconsistent with the formation of mens rea. In a well-known California
case, 82 the defendant, Wetmore, was caught in the victim's apartment under
conditions suggesting that he intended to steal the victim's property.
Charged with burglary, the defendant claimed that he delusionally believed
that the apartment and the property belonged to him. 83 If he told the truth,
he did not intend to enter the apartment of another or to commit the felony
of larceny, the elements of which include intentionally taking and carrying
away the property of another.
Note that even if mental disorder does negate subjective mental states
such as purpose, intention, knowledge, or conscious awareness of risk, it
would never negate the objective negligence standard. The person with
mental disorder who is unaware of a risk that a reasonable person should be
aware of is by definition unreasonable. Even the Model Penal Code, which
individualizes the negligence inquiry somewhat by requiring the decision
maker to consider the behavior of a "reasonable person ... in the actor's
situation" before making a finding of negligence,8 4 would not go so far as to
consider mental disorder-irrational behavior-as part of the "situation."
The Model Penal Code never gives a clear definition of the "situation," but
it does make clear that it wishes to avoid complete subjectivization of the
reasonable person standard. 85 To assess reasonableness from the standpoint
of the "reasonable irrational" person would deprive the negligence standard
of all objectivity.86 Consider the lemon example again. The killer is at least
80 Phillip Resnick, Andrea Yates Case: Insanity on Trial, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 147, 149

(2007); see also Deborah W. Denno, Who Is Andrea Yates? A Short Story About Insanity,

10 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1 (2003) (providing a thorough account of the entire
background and an analysis of the expert testimony).
81 Resnick, supra note 80; see also Denno, supra note 80.
82People v. Wetmore, 583 P.2d 1308 (Cal. 1978).
83 Id. at 1310.

84 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1962) (emphasis added).
85 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 at 242 (1985).

86 Failure to recognize this point and the incorrect belief that the Model Penal Code
adopts nearly complete subjectivization for negligence are major analytic reasons that the
primary contemporary proposal to abolish the insanity defense fails. See Christopher
Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in CriminalCases, 86
VA. L. REv. 1199, 1239 (2000), reprintedin expandedform, but with unchanged analysis, in
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guilty of negligent homicide because a reasonable person should have been
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the object being squeezed
was a person's throat and not a lemon. We defer discussion of whether a
conviction and punishment for negligent homicide in such a case would be
fair or even make sense until a later section of the article.8
In other cases, mental disorder may not necessarily be inconsistent
with formation of mens rea, but evidence of disorder may help bolster the
defendant's claim that he did not form it. For example, suppose a
psychotically disorganized person gets lost in an empty part of town on a
cold winter's night and cannot find his way home. To escape the cold, he
breaks into a building, is caught, and is charged with burglary on the theory
that he intended to steal. In this case, he is fully capable of forming the
intent to steal, but his mental disorder helps explain why he broke in simply
to keep warm.
Again, the crucial issue is to determine what the defendant's actual
mental state was and to compare that mental state to the mental state
required by the crime charged. Of course, the lurking problem is that it is
sometimes very difficult to determine a defendant's mental state at the time
of the crime. Memories fade or are wittingly or unwittingly shaped by what
happens afterwards. Defendants have powerful incentives to lie, but these
difficulties arise in all retrospective mental state evaluations, and not just in
cases involving mental disorder. As we discuss later in this Article, one of
the primary skills we have evolved over the last 100,000 years is the ability
to discern the intentions of other humans. 8 8 Like Holmes's dog, jurors are
quite good at recognizing the difference between a kick and a stumble.
D. LEGAL INSANITY
The tests for legal insanity may be placed in two broad categoriescognitive and control (also called "volitional"). There is some doctrinal
variation among the jurisdictions, but the essential questions are similar.
Cognitive tests ask whether, at the time of the crime, the defendant
was disabled by mental disorder from knowing, appreciating, or
understanding the nature of his conduct or that it was morally or legally

CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 52-53 (2006) [hereinafter Slobogin, An End to Insanity];

see also

CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY (2006) [hereinafter SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE].

Professor Slobogin's "integrationist" alternative to the insanity defense is discussed infra in
the text accompanying notes 229-62.
87 See infra Part V.
88See infra text accompanying note 314-31.

1092

STEPHENJ. MORSE & MORRIS B. HOFFMAN

[Vol. 97

wrong. 89 Control tests ask whether, as a result of mental disorder, the
defendant was unable at the time of the crime to control his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 90
Prior to the 1980s, all American states and all federal circuits had an
insanity defense test. The most common was M'Naghten or some variant of
its cognitive inquiry. Beginning in the last part of the nineteenth century, a
minority of jurisdictions added a control test, but no jurisdiction adopted
solely a control test. The Model Penal Code promulgated an influential test
that had both a cognitive and a control prong, and that used less all-or-none,
bright-line language than standard insanity rules. 9' By the time John W.
Hinckley was acquitted by reason of insanity in 1982 for attempting to
assassinate President Reagan and others, most states that had reformed their
insanity defense followed the Model Penal Code, as had all but one federal
92
circuit.
Hinckley was acquitted under the Model Penal Code test, which
spurred an immense federal and state legislative backlash against the
insanity defense in general and control tests in particular. In the wake of
the unpopular verdict, many states reverted to a pure cognitive test, and
Congress adopted such a test, providing for the first time a uniform test for
legal insanity in federal trials. 93 In addition, Congress and many state
legislatures placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant. 94 Five states
abolished the insanity defense altogether, although one state supreme court
found abolition unconstitutional.95 The Supreme Court has never ruled,
however, whether the insanity defense is or is not constitutionally required.

89 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
90 Sometimes the tests for insanity are phrased instead as tests for "sanity," in which
case, of course, the disjunctive becomes conjunctive. Thus, the cognitive test for sanity is
whether a defendant understands the nature of his actions and knows they are wrong. (These
are the two traditional M'Naghten prongs, one of which was dispensed with by Clark. See
infra text accompanying notes 121-38.)
91 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962). A person is not responsible for her criminal
conduct if, at the time of the crime, "as a result of mental disease or defect [the defendant]
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law."
92 See Jodie English, The Light Between Twilight and Dusk: Federal Criminal
Law and
the Volitional Insanity Defense, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 28 n. 153 (1988-1989).
9' 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (2000). "It is an affirmative defense ... that, at the time of the
commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of severe mental
disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his
acts." See also United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), affd, 672 F.2d
115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
94 18 U.S.C. § 17(b) (2000); see, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(C) (2001).
95 See infra notes 196-197.
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None of the cognitive or control tests for legal insanity is self-defining.
All require substantial interpretation. To begin, how should the threshold
requirement of a mental disease or disorder or defect be defined? The
Supreme Court has made clear that the definition of mental disorder as a
legal criterion for insanity is a legal question and within the discretion of
the states. Thus, states are free to limit legal insanity to cases involving
severe mental disorder or to define mental disorder in a non-traditional way,
as long as the definition is minimally rational. They need not be bound by
mental health science disciplines, such as
the definitions used by the
96
psychiatry and psychology.
Moreover, there is substantial leeway in whether the tests should be
read narrowly or broadly. Consider whether Andrea Yates knew what she
was doing when she drowned her five children to save them from Satan's
eternal torments. She did know that they were children, that drowning
would kill them, and that killing them violated the law and the dominant
view of morality, but she also delusionally believed that homicide was
necessary to save the children from a fate far worse than premature death.
In a narrow sense, she did know what she was doing and that it was morally
and legally wrong. In a broader sense, however, and, assuming we believe
her and her expert psychiatrists, she did not know what she was doing
because she was genuinely motivated by an utterly mistaken belief that was
the product of some profound abnormality. She plausibly would have been
justified if the belief were true. Using words like "appreciate" or
"understand," rather than "know," in a cognitive test will not help. They
may signal that the test is to be interpreted more broadly-but how much
more broadly and in what way? 97
Control tests are even more difficult to apply. We all have a common
sense understanding of when someone's perceptions or beliefs are
irrational, but what does it mean to say that a person cannot control
himself? If a person is having difficulty conforming to law because he is
irrational, then irrationality is doing the potentially excusing work and there
is no need for a separate control test.9 8 For example, if Ms. Yates believed
96

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521

U.S. 346, 359 (1997).

97 See Douglas Mossman, United States v. Lyons: Toward a New Conception of Legal

Insanity, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 49, 54-57 (1988). Dr. Mossman provides a
thoughtful definition of "appreciate" in the context of the insanity defense, but the term does
not entail his usage and the criteria he employs could by interpretation be made part of the
criteria for "knowledge" or "understanding." Moreover, a court could interpret the term
"appreciate" in the same general way as Mossman, but it could also make the interpretation
narrower or even broader. Again, no term for the cognitive test is self-defining or
talismanic.
98 See Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and IrrationalPeople, 88 VA. L. REv.
1025, 1054-63 (2002).
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that she had an absolute moral obligation to "save" the children by
drowning them, it would indeed be difficult for her to obey the law. Here,
though, the problem is her irrational belief, not a failure of self-control. In
fact, lack of rationality explains most cases of failure to conform to law
among people with severe mental disorder.
Control tests are often characterized as volitional, as if mental disorder
has somehow disabled the agent's volitional capacities, but this locution is
confusing and should be abandoned. There is no consensual definition of
volition or will in any of the relevant disciplines, such as psychology or
philosophy, and this formulation quickly dissolves into the intractable
issues of how the brain enables the mind and how intentions are related to
actions.
Perhaps one helpful way of thinking about volition is as the executory
mental state that produces an action in response to an intention.99 Viewed
in this way, however, virtually no one with a mental disorder has a
volitional problem because people with disorders are fully able to execute
the intentions that their disordered thoughts, perceptions, and desires may
motivate. 00 There may be some unusual cases when a symptom of mental
disorder, such as anxiety, "paralyzes" a person who has a legal duty to act.
In such instances, there are indeed volitional problems, but such cases are
rare to the vanishing point in criminal law. There is a common sense
meaning of lack of self-control, of course, but terming it a volitional
problem perpetuates a conceptual and pseudo-scientific confusion.
Despite the definitional and empirical difficulties, however, some
criminologists and legal philosophers nevertheless believe control tests are
necessary for crimes committed by defendants with impulse disorders, such
as Intermittent Explosive Disorder,0l' or "disorders of desire," such as
Pedophilia. 10 2 In the former case, though, the problem is that the person
intermittently appears to be unable to bring rationality to bear; thus, a
cognitive test best subsumes such cases. In the latter type of case, the
defendant is usually entirely in touch with reality and probably knows and

99 Among legal philosophers, this conception has been advanced best by Michael S.
Moore. MOORE, supra note 65, at 113-65. Moore's view of volition, like all others, is
controversial.
100 HERBERT

FINGARETTE &

ANNE

FINGARETTE HASSE,

MENTAL DISABILITIES AND

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 44-65 (1979).
101 See, e.g., DSM-IV-TR, supra note 50, at 663-67; see also Ronald C. Kessler et al.,
The Prevalence and Correlates of DSM-IV Intermittent Explosive Disorder in the National
Comorbidity Survey Replication, 63 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 669, 669 (2006). Recent data
indicate that the twelve-month prevalence of this disorder is 3.9% of the population and the
lifetime prevalence is 7.3%.
102 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 50, at 571-72.
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endorses the legal and moral code. Nonetheless, he claims that he cannot
"help" or "control" his conduct.
The problem in cases of alleged lack of self-control is distinguishing
the disordered person from any other agent who also wants to do something
very badly that the agent should not do, such as the very greedy person
tempted terribly to steal. Simply characterizing the desire as disordered in
one case but not the other cannot resolve the question of control; it simply
begs that question. Why should we ever excuse someone who acts wrongly
in response to a very strong desire, whether that desire is normal or
abnormal? Moreover, what theory or account allows us to characterize
desires, as opposed to perceptions and beliefs, as irrational? 0 3 How do we
distinguish between an irresistible desire and a desire simply not resisted?
Concerns like these led both the American Bar Association and the
American Psychiatric Association to recommend abolition of an
independent control test during the insanity reform movement that occurred
in response to the Hinckley verdict. 10 4 One of us has argued that control
cases can always be assimilated to cognitive cases in any situation in which.
an excuse is plausible. 10 5 It is sufficient here, however, to recognize that
control tests are problematic and do not avoid the interpretive problems that
beset more familiar cognitive tests.
The relevance of mental disorder to legal insanity tests is conceptually
straightforward, although evidentiary problems can arise. Insanity tests
address normative issues concerning responsibility that are broader than
claims involving action or mens rea, which are more factual. Moreover,
they are not tests about mechanisms in the literal sense. They do not
address brain anatomy or physiology, for example. They do address acting
human beings who may have difficulties with cognition or control. The
finder of fact needs the thickest possible description of the defendant's
perceptions, thoughts, and feelings at the time of the crime in order to
determine whether the legal standard for insanity is met. The fact-finder
employing a cognitive or control test must thus evaluate how mental
disorder affects perceptions, thoughts, beliefs, desires, and feelings. While
anatomical, physiological, and other kinds of non-behavioral evidence may
help the finder of fact make inferences about the defendant's psychological
phenomenology, the ultimate test is behavioral, making mental disorder
evidence crucially relevant.
103 ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 139-40 (1993) (denying the existence

of a substantive theory of the rationality of desires).
104 AM. BAR Ass'N CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 339-42 (1989); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, INSANITY DEFENSE
POSITION STATEMENT (1985).
105 Morse, supra note 98, at 1064-75.
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Before concluding the discussion of legal insanity, it is important to
clarify a persistent confusion about the insanity defense-the claim that the
criminal act was "caused" by mental disorder does not mean that the agent
lacked free will or that the agent was determined. Free will or the absence
of determinism is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of insanity
under any definition. No insanity defense standard requires a finding that
the defendant lacked "free will" or that his behavior was "determined."
These locutions are often used to signal a conclusion that the defendant was
or was not legally insane, but lack of free will or determinism is not a
criterion for legal insanity and does no real explanatory work. People are
found legally insane because they lack rational capacity or, more
controversially, because they cannot conform their behavior to the
requirements of law.10 6 Failure to understand that free will and determinism
have nothing to do with legal insanity or criminal responsibility more
generally is a ceaseless
source of confusion about the need and criteria for
107
an insanity defense.
Further, the "causal role" that mental disorder may play in criminal
behavior must be properly understood. Causation in this instance means
that mental disorder produced distorted perceptions, thoughts, or desires
that influenced the defendant's reasons for action. It does not refer to
"mechanical" causation. It has nothing to do with determinism or free will.
The actions of people motivated in part by abnormal perceptions, beliefs.
and desires are actions, but they may be excused if the abnormality renders
the agent sufficiently irrational. Causation of behavior by abnormal beliefs,
for example, is no different from, no more "causal" than, causation of
behavior by normal beliefs. The only difference is that in the former case,
the agent may be irrational and should therefore be excused.
Lack of rational capacity-not determinism, lack of free will, or
abnormal causation-justifies the insanity defense and explains its
criteria. 1s
E. MENS REA AND LEGAL INSANITY
As should be clear from the foregoing Parts, the mens rea issue is
entirely distinct from the legal insanity issue, even if precisely the same
evidence would be relevant to adjudicating both claims. People with
mental disorder are not automatons; rather, they are agents who act for
106 Stephen J. Morse,

The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic Psychiatry and

Psychology, 25 LAW & BEHAV. SCi. 203,210-12 (2007).
107See, e.g., id. at 219-20; Slobogin, An End to Insanity, supra note 86, at 1222, 1238

(implying that causation is an excuse and that determinism plays an analytic role in insanity
determinations).
108 See supra discussion about determinism and causation at notes 106-07.
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reasons. Their reasons may be motivated by distorted perceptions and
beliefs, but they do form intentions and have knowledge of what they are
doing in the narrow, most literal sense. Thus, it is very uncommon for
mental disorder to negate all mens rea, even if the defendant is profoundly
delusional, as Daniel M'Naghten and Andrea Yates presumably were.
In some rare cases, as we have already discussed, evidence of mental
disorder might negate mens rea because the mental state it produces will be
flatly inconsistent with the mens rea required by the definition of the crime
or because it indirectly helps to explain why mens rea was not formed on
that occasion.109 In these cases, the same evidence that a defendant was
delusional may both negate mens rea and support a finding of legal insanity,
but the questions being answered by the evidence are different."1 0
IV. CLARK V. ARIZONA. 1.

A. BACKGROUND
In the early morning of June 21, 2000, Eric Clark, a seventeen-yearold resident of Flagstaff, Arizona, was riding around in his pickup truck
blaring loud music." 2 Responding to complaints about the noise, Officer
Jeffrey Moritz, who was in uniform, turned on the emergency lights and
siren of his marked patrol car and pulled Clark over. 1 3 Moritz left the
patrol car and told Clark to remain 5 where he was.1 14 Less than a minute
later, Clark shot and killed Moritz.'
Clark was charged with intentionally killing a police officer knowing
that the officer was acting in the line of duty.' 16 He did not contest the
shooting and death, but he claimed that as a result of paranoid
schizophrenic delusions, he lacked the required mens rea for the crime
victim was a
charged (the intent to kill a person and the knowledge that the
17
police officer) and that, in any event, he was legally insane.'

See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
110 For example, if Clark really believed he was killing an alien impersonating a police
109

officer, he lacked knowledge that he was killing a police officer, thus negating the mens rea
of knowledge. For the same reason, he did not know what he was doing or that it was
wrong.
"' 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006).
112 Id. at 2716.
113

Id.

114 Id.
115Id.
116

Id. All statements of the facts are taken from the Supreme Court opinion.

117

Id. at 2717-18.
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Substantial evidence, including Clark's statements to classmates a few
weeks earlier that he wanted to shoot police officers, suggested that Clark
knew Moritz was a police officer and that he had planned just such a
shooting. He had even arguably lured Officer Moritz by driving his truck
with its radio blaring in a residential area. On the other hand, Clark
presented testimony from family, classmates, and school officials about his
bizarre behavior during the preceding year, including rigging his bedroom
with fishing line, beads, and chimes to warn him of intruders, and keeping a
bird in his car to warn him of airborne poison. 11 8 These actions were
plausibly a result of his paranoid delusions. Indeed, there was lay and
expert testimony that Clark thought Flagstaff was populated with "aliens,"
including some that were impersonating police officers, that the aliens were
trying to kill him, and that only bullets could stop the aliens. 1l9 The defense
expert also testified that Clark may have turned the radio up to drown out
auditory hallucinations.12 0
The operative Arizona legal insanity test under which Clark was tried
was limited to the cognitive right/wrong test: once the burden of production
was met, the defendant had the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that "at the time of the commission of the criminal act [he] was
afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that [he] did not
know the criminal act was wrong."' 12 1 The operative rule concerning the
admission of evidence of mental disorder to negate mens rea was based on
an Arizona Supreme Court decision, State v. Mott, which held that
psychiatric testimony was inadmissible to negate specific intent and that
evidence of mental disorder, short of legal insanity, was not admissible to
negate any mens rea element.122
At a bench trial, the judge permitted introduction of all the lay and
23
expert testimony about Clark's mental disorder at the time of the crime.'
He ultimately ruled, however, that Mott barred him from using it to
consider mens rea and that he could consider this evidence only to decide
the issue of legal insanity. 124 He found Clark guilty of first degree
118

Id. at 2717.

119

'Id.

120

Id. at 2739.

121

AIuz. REV.

STAT. ANN.

§ 13-502(A) (2007).

122 State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied,

520 U.S.

1234 (1997). The Arizona Supreme Court mischaracterized the use of battered woman
syndrome evidence offered to negate mens rea as a "diminished capacity" defense. Id. at
1050. It then held, consistent with its mistaken premise, that the Arizona legislature had
implicitly rejected that defense when it refused to recognize generalized diminished capacity
and ruled that the evidence could be excluded. Id.
123 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2717.
124 Id.
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murder. 125 Although the judge also specifically found that Clark was
suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and had distorted perceptions at the
time of the crime, he nonetheless found Clark legally sane because he
26
concluded that Clark knew his actions were wrong. 1
Clark appealed on the grounds that the Mott rule violated procedural
due process and that Arizona's narrow insanity defense (which, as
mentioned above, included only one of the two disjunctive M'Naghten
prongs) violated substantive due process. 27 The Arizona court of appeals
affirmed the conviction, the Arizona Supreme Court denied certiorari, and
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide "whether due
process prohibits Arizona from thus narrowing its insanity test or from
excluding evidence of mental illness and incapacity
due to mental illness to
' 28
rebut evidence of the requisite criminal intent."'
B. THE INSANITY ISSUE
Clark argued that the full M'Naghten rule was the minimum test
necessary to satisfy due process and that Arizona's truncated test was
therefore unconstitutional. Writing for the five-Justice majority, Justice
Souter rejected this claim, concluding that the full M'Naghten rule is not a
29
fundamental principle of justice subsumed by the Due Process Clause.1
The Court correctly noted that the history of legal insanity defenses in
this country demonstrates substantial diversity of language and
interpretation within the broad cognitive and control categories. As Justice
Souter pointed out, insanity definitions vary widely across the United
States, and four states have abolished the defense entirely.13 ° The Court
also observed that the test for legal insanity is not a test for mental disorder.
The tests for insanity and disorder have been devised for different
purposes-assessing criminal responsibility and justifying mental health
treatment-and there is controversy about both. This is inevitable because
the test for legal insanity is a matter of policy. The Court concluded that
because there is so much variation, "no particular formulation has evolved
into a baseline for due process, and ... the insanity rule, like the
125Id. at 2718.
126

Id.

127 See

supra note 90 and accompanying text.

12 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2718.
129 Id. at 2715. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined
Justice Souter's majority opinion. Justice Breyer concurred in the majority's analysis, but
dissented from the result because he would have remanded the case to let the Arizona courts
apply the new rule announced by the Court. Justice Kennedy wrote the dissent, in which
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined.
130 Id. at 2721.
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of criminal offenses, is substantially open to state
conceptualization
131
choice."
Although reasonable people might believe that Arizona's truncated
insanity test is not optimally just, the Court's holding on this issue-that
due process does not require any "single canonical formulation of legal
133
insanity" 132-seems plainly right, especially after Mullaney and Egelhoff
But in the course of reaching this unremarkable conclusion, the Court may
have unwittingly confounded the two M'Naghten prongs.
In its original characterization of the disjunctive M'Naghten rule, as
well as in its categorization of types of insanity rules, the Court referred to
knowledge of the nature and quality of one's act as a question of "cognitive
capacity," and knowledge of right and wrong as a question of "moral
capacity." 34 In fact, both are cognitive questions, and indeed that is why
both are usually alternative prongs of cognitive tests such as M'Naghten.
They differ only in the object of the knowledge required. Moreover, mental
disorder seldom disables a person's moral compass. The person may be
making a "moral mistake" because his or her perceptions and beliefs are
distorted by disorder, but the moral sense generally remains intact. Andrea
Yates's delusions might genuinely have produced the belief that her
behavior was morally justified, but her moral capacity was hardly disabled.
Indeed, one could view her act as an indication that her moral sense was
perfectly intact, albeit driven by a delusional belief.
The Court also consistently referred to control tests as "volitional" and
characterized them as asking "whether a person was so lacking in volition
due to a mental defect or illness that he could not have controlled his
actions.' 3 5 We recognize that it is common to refer to control tests as
volitional, but, as we argue above, this is a confused locution that should be
abandoned. 36 Whether Clark thought he was killing an alien to save
himself or thought he was killing an officer because he was angry at the
police, his volition or will perfectly and competently executed the intention
he formed. Yates perfectly executed her intention to kill, motivated by her
desire to save the children from Satan's eternal torments. Both may have
experienced grave difficulty conforming to the law because they suffered
profound delusions about the nature of the world, but in neither case was a
defect of will the source of the problem.

"3'Id. at 2722.

132 Id.

supra text accompanying notes 27-30, 36-48.
Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2719.
131 Id. at 2720.
136 See supra Part III.D.
133 See
134
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The Court also decided that the narrow Arizona legal insanity rule was
constitutionally acceptable because evidence of so-called cognitive
incapacity-lack of knowledge of what one was doing-is relevant to the
right/wrong test and has the same significance for both.1 37 The Court
recognized that one might show lack of moral knowledge without showing
lack of factual knowledge about what one was doing, but it correctly
observed that lack of the latter was sufficient to show lack of moral
knowledge. 138 After all, if the agent does not know what he is doing, he
cannot rationally know that it is right or wrong. Indeed, the Court
interpreted Arizona's legislative narrowing of the rule as a streamlining
change rather than as a genuinely substantive alteration. 139 Even under the
narrow rule, then, all evidence of lack of factual knowledge would
apparently be relevant and admissible, as it was at trial.
C. THE MENS REA ISSUE
Clark's second due process claim was a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Arizona rule, announced in State v. Mott, that
excluded expert mental health testimony on the issue of mens rea. 140 In
addressing this issue, the Court's majority goes quite wrong, not only
confounding mens rea and insanity, but forcing psychiatric and
psychological evidence into an arbitrary system of classification that is
unworkable and that had never been considered or argued by Arizona.
Although the extent of the Mott rule's evidentiary exclusion is not
entirely clear, it is clear that it prevents defendants from introducing
substantial, relevant, and reliable mental health expert testimony concerning
whether or not the requisite mens rea was formed in fact. Recall Clark's
factual claim that, as a result of delusions produced by mental disorder, he
actually believed Officer Moritz was a dangerous "alien" impersonating a
police officer.'14 If this were true, then Clark would be simply not guilty of
137Clark,

126 S. Ct. at 2722.

138 Contrary

to the Court's assertion, it is possible that a defendant might not know what

he or she was doing but would know that it was wrong. For example, suppose a defendant
violently attacked a person with the belief that the person was a dog. See Joseph M.
Livermore & Paul E. Meehl, The Virtues of M'Naghten, 51 MINN. L. REV. 789, 809 (1967).
In such a case, the defendant would not know what he or she was doing but would know that
cruelty to animals was a moral and legal wrong. It is not clear from Clark's reasoning if a
rule like Arizona's, which permits a conviction in such a case, would be constitutional
because the Court did not envisage this possibility. It is plausible to claim that blame and
punishment would be unjust in such cases. Nevertheless, although such cases are a
theoretical possibility, they will be so rare that the Court's analysis is reasonable.
' Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2723.
140 Id. at 2724.
141 Id. at 2749.
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intentionally killing a person (unless the definition of "person" was
expanded to include extraterrestrials), let alone guilty of knowingly killing a
police officer acting in the line of duty (again, unless the definition of
"police officer in the line of duty" was expanded to include an
extraterrestrial whose alien line of duty was to impersonate a police officer).
The trial judge permitted Clark to introduce expert testimony that
addressed the mens rea question, but ultimately decided that Mott barred
him from considering this testimony in reaching a verdict on the homicide
charge.1 42 Thus, Clark was functionally prevented from using relevant and
reliable testimony to cast a reasonable doubt about the mens rea for the
crime charged.
1. The TripartiteEvidence Construction
In order to insulate the Mott rule from Clark's due process claim, the
Supreme Court majority mischaracterized Arizona's rule. Instead of
holding that Mott excluded expert mental health testimony on the issue of
mens rea, the Court ruled that Mott actually applied only to two of the three
types of distinguishable mens rea evidence: observation evidence, mentaldisease evidence, and capacity evidence. 143 The Court then upheld the rule
against a due process attack simply by announcing that the Arizona courts
could not possibly have intended it to apply to the first category. 44
The majority defined the first category, "observation evidence," "in the
everyday sense [as] testimony from those who observed what [a defendant]
did and heard what he said; this category would also include testimony that
an expert witness might give about [the specific defendant's] tendency to
think in a certain way and his behavioral characteristics. 14 5 The Court
pronounced that this first category of mens rea evidence was admissible
46
despite Mott and could be presented by either lay or expert witnesses.
The second category, "mental-disease evidence," was defined as
"opinion testimony that [a defendant] suffered from a mental disease with

142

Id. at 2717-18. A psychiatrist called by the defense not only testified that Clark was

suffering from paranoid schizophrenia with delusions at the time of the killing and was
therefore insane, but also that because of those delusions, Clark could not have formed the
intent to kill Officer Moritz with knowledge that Moritz was a policeman. Id.
141 Id. at 2724-26.
Id. at 2725-26.
Id. at 2724.
146 Id. at 2725. It is interesting that the majority constructs these categories of mens rea
evidence without being explicit about whether they are meant to describe the actual limits of
Mott (an odd thing for a federal court to be doing when the rule at issue was invented by a
state court) or the constitutional limit of Mott's reach. It must be the latter, but the
majority's reluctance to admit it is puzzling.
'"

141
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features described by the witness."'' 47 That is, such testimony provides
general information about the mental disorder from which the specific
defendant allegedly suffers. The Court pronounced this kind of evidence,
which is almost always provided by mental health experts, inadmissible
under Mott.
The majority defined the third category, "capacity evidence," as
evidence about a defendant's "capacity for cognition and moral judgment
(and ultimately also his capacity to form mens rea).' ' 148 This, too, is opinion
evidence provided by experts, and, as with category two, the Court upheld
Mott's exclusion of this type of mens rea evidence.
In upholding the constitutionality of Mott's bar to mens rea evidence in
categories two and three, the Clark majority mistakenly refers to barring
these types of evidence on the legal insanity issue, not mens rea: "Thus,
only opinion testimony going to mental defect or disease, and its effect on
the cognitive or moral capacities on which sanity depends under the
Arizona rule, is restricted.' 49 Is this astonishing error typographical, or a
deeper reflection of the
majority's own confusion between these two very
50
different principles?

The majority's unprecedented tripartite construction fails to do the
theoretical work necessary to draw a sensible line between which types of
expert mental disorder evidence states may and may not exclude. This
classification was not part of Arizona law (or any state law we know about)
and cannot be found in any Supreme Court precedent. If that were not
enough, neither of the parties or amici ever suggested such a construction in
their briefs or at oral argument.
Moreover, this construction not only allowed the Court's majority to
find the artificially restricted rule constitutional, it also allowed it,
alternatively, to conclude that Clark failed to preserve his constitutional
argument on this point because he never asked the trial court to admit
mental state evidence in category one despite the exclusion of categories
two and three.' 5 1 As Justice Kennedy aptly put it in his dissent, "Seizing
upon a theory invented here by the Court itself, the Court narrows Clark's
claim so he cannot raise the point everyone else thought was involved in the
case."'

152

147 Id.

Id.
149Id. at 2726 (emphasis added).
148

150

This is not an isolated example of the majority conflating insanity and mens rea. As

discussed infra in the text accompanying note 154, they do it again later in the opinion.
' Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2727.
152 Id. at 2738 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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Justice Kennedy, and to some extent Justice Breyer in his concurrence,
also recognized that the majority's tripartite classification quickly breaks
down in practice and therefore ends up being an unworkable solution to this
constitutional problem. 153 There are clear, core cases of each type, but
testimony rarely comes so neatly packaged. For example, sound empirical
evidence about the characteristics of people suffering from a particular
mental disorder is based on observation and is factual. In many cases, such
evidence would help a finder of fact understand the behavior of a defendant
who suffers from that disorder, even though the evidence comes from the
observations of others. That is to say, much of the inferential expert
evidence Justice Souter believes Mott may constitutionally exclude is
actually observational evidence that could not have been excluded had the
observations been about the defendant himself. Would experts be allowed
to testify about their own observations of the defendant, but then not be
permitted to testify about the features of a recognized diagnostic category
that help explain those observations?
All clinical judgments in medicine, psychiatry, and clinical psychology
are, by their very nature, informed by the clinician's observation of the
particular patient being seen, by the accumulated wisdom of observations of
other patients by that clinician and others, and by findings from empirical
studies. The Court's fictitious categories of evidence not only bleed into
one another, but they also seem peculiarly unable to do the important
constitutional work the Court asks of them.
The Court also reasoned that Clark's due process claim depended on
the application of the presumption of innocence, the presumption of sanity,
and "the principle that a criminal defendant is entitled to present relevant
and favorable evidence on an element of the offense charged."',5 4 The Court
noted, as it was bound to under Winship, that the presumption of innocence
could only be overcome by proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all
elements, including mens rea. This is boilerplate.
The Court then observed that the presumption of sanity is universal in
some form, but confusingly mischaracterized it as a presumption "that a
defendant has the capacity to form the mens rea necessary for a verdict of
guilt and the consequent criminal responsibility."'155 Once again, the Court
confused mens rea with insanity, this time in the heart of the opinion
explaining why Arizona may constitutionally prevent a defendant from
introducing category two and three evidence to negate mens rea. Indeed,

153 Id. at 2737-38 (Breyer, J., concurring), 2738-39 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 2729 (majority opinion).

"' Id. at 2730.
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the whole presumption-of-sanity discussion in this section of the opinion is
irrelevant to Clark's mens rea claim.
The Court not only blurred the distinction between mens rea and
insanity, but also made wholly inconsistent observations about the
relationship between the two. It rejected the argument that mens rea and
insanity are "entirely distinguishable," yet obscurely noted that insanity
"trumps" mens rea, suggesting that they are not functionally distinguishable
56
because the former subsumes the latter when both are claimed.
The majority correctly acknowledged that evidence of the defendant's
state of mind at the time of the crime might indicate the defendant's actual
mental state and the presence of an enduring incapacity to form the requisite
mens rea. 157 Given that acknowledgment and the majority's recognition of
a defendant's constitutional right to present evidence that negates an
element, how did the Court conclude that Arizona could constitutionally
deprive Clark of that right? The majority reached this conclusion by
claiming that Arizona could permissibly "channel" mental disorder
evidence solely into the insanity issue and out of the mens rea issue because
Arizona had legitimate state interests in such channeling.
2. The ChannelingArgument
The Court accepted Clark's characterization of the Mott rule as a rule
of evidence rather than as a reworking of the elements of homicide, and
58
conceded again that the evidence was relevant. As Montana v. Egelhof
makes clear, states may of course preclude relevant defense evidence-even
evidence that rebuts an element of the offense-if the state has a legitimate
purpose in excluding the evidence. What were Arizona's "legitimate
purposes" in channeling some forms of expert mental state evidence into
insanity and away from mens rea? Here is where the Court's reasoning
goes radically wrong.
The Court's first identified "legitimate reason" is yet another example
of its conflation of mens rea and legal insanity. In the part of the opinion
addressing the insanity issue, the Court reaffirmed Arizona's authority to
define legal insanity as it wishes and to place the burden of persuasion for
this defense on the defendant. 159 Consequently, the Court reasoned that if
Arizona is to have this authority in practice as well as in theory, it "must be
able to deny a defendant the opportunity to displace the presumption of

156 Id.at

2731 n.38

157id.
158

See supra text accompanying notes 36-48.

159 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at

2732-33.
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sanity more easily when addressing a different issue .... ,,160 This is a nonsequitur that is based on confusions about the presumption of sanity and
"capacity" that we addressed above. 16 1 There is no presumption of sanity
applicable to the mens rea elements. Even if there were, the presumption
must be rebuttable and a crucial method of rebuttal in a case involving
severe mental disorder would be by the introduction of expert testimony.
Mental disorder and capacity evidence used to negate mens rea could
result in acquittal simply by presenting a reasonable doubt about mens rea,
whereas the same type of evidence used to prove legal insanity would
succeed in Arizona only if the defendant convinced the finder of fact of his
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Such a difference is not a
"displacement" of the presumption of sanity, however. It is simply a
logical consequence of the interaction between the structure of criminal
culpability and Winship's constitutional requirements.
Criminal
responsibility can be avoided either by negating an element of the crime
charged or by establishing an affirmative defense.
Permitting an
affirmative defense, as the Court recognizes, does not remove the State's
obligation to prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Clark's claim
does not undermine Arizona's right to define legal insanity as it wishes.
The Court's second "legitimate purpose" is Arizona's desire "to avoid
' 62
a second avenue for exploring capacity, less stringent for a defendant.'
Mens rea is not about "capacity" or about "criminal responsibility" more
broadly; it is about whether a mental state required by the definition of the
crime charged was in fact formed. Contrary to the Court's assertion,
permitting a jury to use mental-disease or capacity evidence to decide if
there is a reasonable doubt about mens rea is not "in functional
terms... analogous to allowing jurors to decide upon some degree of
diminished capacity to obey the law ... that would prevail as a standalone
defense."' 163 Negation of mens rea is not an independent "defense" of
"diminished capacity." Mens rea negation is simply a straightforward
denial of the prima facie case that needs no special name. The question of
"diminished capacity" is the province of the insanity defense or mitigating
evidence at sentencing, not mens rea negation. The state undeniably has the
authority to reject a partial responsibility mitigating doctrine, but this was
not what Clark was requesting. The majority's constant blurring of the
mens rea and legal insanity issues simply perpetuates this confusion.

160 Id. at

2732.

supra text accompanying notes 155-56.
162 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2733.
161 See
163 Id.
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The Court then articulated a third legitimate purpose: Arizona has
made a determination that mental state evidence is just too unreliable and
risky to be the basis of a complete defense under which a defendant is
entirely acquitted and unconditionally freed. Now, at last, we are at the
heart of Arizona's real concerns. In fact, the Court identified three separate
such risks: (1) the controversial character of some categories of mental
disease; (2) the potential of disease evidence to mislead; and (3) the danger
of according greater certainty to capacity evidence than experts claim for
164
it.
The Court's general conclusion about the second and third risks was
that shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant by channeling the
evidence into the insanity issue would reduce the risk that misleading
evidence would lead to incorrect verdicts.
The Court is certainly correct and has noted on many occasions that
there is great debate about the concept of and criteria for mental
disorders. 65 As a result, caution is warranted "in treating psychological
166
classifications as predicates for excusing otherwise criminal conduct."'
This is true enough, but the same argument applies to any use of diagnostic
information, which is routinely admitted in a wide array of civil and
criminal law contexts, including the insanity defense.
The Court's
argument proves too much.
Moreover, the defendant is not seeking to excuse his conduct. This
might be a valid reason for channeling in the other direction: allowing
mental disorder evidence for mens rea and disallowing it for insanity. It is
not a justification for channeling in the Mott direction, which allows
excusing evidence but disallows evidence that would exonerate because it
defeats the prima facie case. If Eric Clark genuinely thought that he was
killing an alien impersonating an officer, he is simply not guilty, full stop,
of homicide. He killed a person, but he did not commit the crime of
homicide of a police officer, which requires that he intentionally kill a
person with knowledge that the victim was a police officer.
The second risk-that mental-disease, i.e., general diagnostic,
evidence may lead to the incorrect conclusion that the defendant lacks
capacity to form mens rea when in fact he possessed mens rea-is true to a
degree. Avoiding such a risk is no doubt a legitimate state interest. There

'64

Id. at 2734-36.

165See supra Part II.
166

Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2734 (emphasis added). One of us is a long-time critic of the use

of diagnostic information in civil or criminal cases. Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior,
Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 604-15
(1978) [hereinafter Morse, Crazy Behavior]; Stephen J. Morse, Failed Explanations and
CriminalResponsibility: Experts and the Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REV. 971, 1055-70 (1982)
[hereinafter Morse, FailedExplanations].
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is great heterogeneity in psychiatric diagnostic categories and imperfect fit,
as the American Psychiatric Association recognizes, between those
categories and legal questions.167 Testifying experts, alas, do not always
confine themselves to providing rigorously confirmed evidence about the
characteristics of people like the defendant, and instead fall into the trap of
using diagnostic terms that do not inform the legal issues. It is all too easy
for professionals and lay people alike to make the mistake of begging legal
questions based on a psychiatric or psychological diagnosis.
Indeed, the Court pointed out that the testifying experts in Clark made
this error themselves while testifying about legal insanity: they agreed on
the diagnosis of schizophrenia but disagreed about Clark's cognitive and
moral capacity. 68 Given the dangers of mental-disease evidence to
mislead, the Court concluded, and we partially agree, that it is reasonable
for a state to decide to channel the evidence to the insanity defense on
which the defendant can be assigned the burden of persuasion.
This justification for complete channeling of expert evidence to the
insanity issue nevertheless again proves too much. As with some of the
Court's other justifications, there is no reason a state's skepticism about
psychiatric evidence should begin and end with the criminal law. States use
diagnostic information in a host of other legal contexts. 69 If anything, the
law should be more forgiving when criminal blame and punishment are at
stake. Moreover, the problem arises less from the inherent tendency of
diagnostic information to mislead than from confusion about the nature of
the relation of such categories to a legal conclusion. Too often, as we noted
above, 70 people wrongly believe that if a mental disorder played a causal
role, the behavior is akin to a mechanism and the defendant is therefore not
responsible. Further problems arise from the failures of the trial process
adequately to cabin the experts.
Note that the experts in Clark disagreed about his cognitive and moral
capacities-that is, about whether he was legally insane. But insanity is a
legal question to be resolved by a lay jury or judge. Why should we expect
mental health experts to agree about this ultimate legal question about
which they have no more expertise than lay jurors or judges? Indeed, it is
for precisely this reason that expert witnesses in federal criminal trials are
not permitted to offer ultimate legal conclusions about whether a defendant
was legally insane. 17 1 Simple and sensible evidentiary rules like this would

167
168

DSM-IV-TR, supra note 50, at xxxii-xxxiii, xxxvii.
Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2717-18.

169 See supra text accompanying note 167.
170 See supra text accompanying note 108.
171 FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
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diminish the misleading tendencies of diagnostic information without the
need for draconian rules that prevent defendants from defending themselves
with relevant and reliable evidence.
The Court's third and last argument justifying Arizona's channeling
rule considered the dangers that capacity evidence allegedly presents. The
Court pointed out that opinions about the capacity for moral cognition or to
form mens rea are inferential judgments "fraught with multiple perils,"
including accurately determining the defendant's mental state at the time of
the crime and properly understanding the differences between psychological
and legal judgments about capacity. Moreover, testimony about the
defendant's capacity to form mens rea is essentially "ultimate legal issue"
testimony about which mental health experts have no special expertise.
According to the Court, there is a real risk that the expert's judgment about
capacity will have an apparent authority that honest mental health
professionals do not claim to have. States may reasonably address these
dangers by channeling capacity evidence to the insanity issue and placing
the burden of persuasion on the defendant.
The Court's basic critique of capacity evidence is sound. As we have
discussed previously,' 72 evidence about a defendant's capacity to form
mens rea is extremely problematic and often lacks a solid clinical or
scientific foundation. The criminal law would be better off if capacity
evidence were strictly limited or even prohibited. Again, however, the
Court's argument proves too much, since capacity evidence, despite its
limitations, is almost everywhere admissible to address every other question
in criminal and civil law to which it may be relevant.173 Why permit its
limitation here, when so much is at stake for the criminal defendant?
Furthermore, permitting an expert to give an opinion about legal insanitywhich experts are permitted to do almost everywhere-is afortiori ultimate
issue testimony, which the Court rejects concerning the mens rea issue.
Moreover, the Court's capacity argument was marred by providing all
its examples from the context of legal insanity, yet again blurring the two
doctrines. The ultimate issue of legal insanity is considerably less factual
than the ultimate issue of mens rea. The former does depend on a factual
understanding of the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime, but
the finder of fact ultimately must make a normative moral judgment that is
not straightforwardly factual because the borders of all insanity tests are
fuzzy and open to interpretation. In contrast, whether a defendant formed a

172

See supra Part III.C.

173 California prohibits experts in criminal trials from offering an opinion about whether

the defendant had the capacity to form mens rea.

CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 22(b) (1998).

1110

STEPHEN J. MORSE & MORRIS B. HOFFMAN

[Vol: 97

requisite mens rea is, with few exceptions, 174 a purely factual question. As
Justice Kennedy said about Clark in his dissent, "Either Clark knew he was
killing a police officer or he did not. 1 75 The question is not about moral
responsibility but about empirical fact; therefore, the expert is less likely to
mislead about mens rea than about legal insanity. Again, this would argue
for channeling the evidence in the opposite direction.
The central problem with the majority's channeling argument is one of
basic fairness. When a citizen is being threatened with the most awesome
exercise of state power-criminal blame and punishment-it seems that we
should be most permissive in allowing that citizen to defend himself with
the same relevant and reliable evidence allowed without limitation in all
other legal contexts. What is it about the criminal trial that drives the Court
to tolerate defense handicaps it would not tolerate in any other arena?
It is instructive to compare the Court's approach to psychiatric
evidence in another case, Barefoot v. Estelle, 176 which involved a due
process challenge to the admission of a prosecution expert's psychiatric
opinion about a defendant's future dangerousness. The opinion was elicited
in the death penalty phase of a capital trial and was based entirely on the
psychiatrist's response to the prosecutor's hypothetical questions. Barefoot
claimed, with the support of all the relevant mental health organizations as
amici, that clinical predictions by mental health professionals of a
defendant's future dangerous conduct were so inaccurate that they would
inevitably lead to erroneous sentences. 77 Although capital punishment was
at stake, the Court upheld the admission of such predictions and ruled that
the deficiencies of the testimony went simply to its weight and could be
addressed by cross-examination. 178
All the same arguments the Court mounts in Clark against mentaldisease and capacity evidence apply a fortiori to predictions of
dangerousness, and there is no reason the same remedy that saved the
potentially misleading evidence in Barefoot-vigorous cross-examination
to expose its defects--could not apply equally in Clark. How can it be fair
to let the state present problematic mental health evidence to support
imposition of capital punishment but deny the defendant the right to use
similar evidence to defend himself against a charge that he even committed
a crime?
174 For

example, the "premeditation" standard that in many jurisdictions makes an
intentional killing a first degree murder often involves some degree of normative evaluation.
Hate motivation for hate crimes is another example.
175Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2743 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
176 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
177Id. at 898-901.
178

Id. at 903.
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The Court in Clark never satisfactorily addresses this basic issue of
fairness, or the extraordinary degree to which these kinds of channeling
rules compromise the right of citizens to demonstrate their innocence.
Clark may or may not have believed that Officer Moritz was an alienindeed, the trial judge concluded that he did not. If the trial judge really did
not consider the relevant and reliable expert evidence that Mott excluded,
Clark did not have a fair chance to cast reasonable doubt on the mens rea
necessary to convict him of first degree murder.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND WISDOM OF ABOLISHING MENS REA
AND LEGAL INSANITY

We consider in this Part the question of whether due process mandates
the requirement of mens rea for prima facie guilt and an insanity defense,
and, even if the answer is "no," whether states should nevertheless retain
these doctrines. After all, if states are or should be free to abolish these
doctrines entirely, defendants like Clark will be hard-pressed to argue that
states may not impose reasonable limitations on them, including truncating
the M'Naghten test or channeling most expert mental abnormality evidence
into insanity.
A. ABOLISHING MENS REA
We will not linger over whether states may constitutionally abolish
mens rea. This has been an unresolved question of constitutional law ever
since the emergence of the regulatory state and the concomitant growth and
acceptability of strict liability crimes. 179 Nonetheless, it has been clear at
least since Morrisette v. United States'80 that mens rea is essential to
criminal law, and that states and Congress bear a heavy burden of justifying
departures from it. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has never crossed the
line from "essential" to "constitutionally required," even for common law
crimes at the core of criminal law whose mens rea elements predated the
Constitution.
Part of the reason the Supreme Court has never done this is that no
legislature, to our knowledge, has ever been so bold as to purport to convert
a serious common law crime into a strict liability crime. Consequently, this

179 See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (upholding strict liability
and punishment for up to a year for shipping misbranded pharmaceuticals); United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (upholding strict liability and punishment for up to five years for
selling controlled substances without the order form required by the Narcotic Act of 1914).
"80 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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difficult constitutional question has lingered at the edges of justiciability,
drawing the considerable attention of academics but not courts., 8'
Clark is especially disappointing because, unlike any of the other
handful of cases decided by the Court in this context, it was tailor-made for
exposition about the constitutional pedigree of mens rea. The Court could
have made short shrift of Clark's attack on the channeling rule by
announcing that Arizona was constitutionally free to abolish mens rea
entirely, and thus could constitutionally limit evidence that would negate
mens rea. It could even have upheld the rule while acknowledging that
Arizona was not free to abolish mens rea.
Instead, it avoided the issue
82
entirely, at considerable intellectual cost.'
We see no reason to think the Court will depart from the deference-tostates course charted in Patterson, Egelhoff and Clark, 83 but, to the extent
the constitutional question requires a defense of mens rea as a core principle
of blameworthiness, we gladly take up the challenge. We do so despite
enduring skepticism about substantive due process' 84 and about the
constitutional authority of federal courts to interfere in such a fundamental
and traditional state task as defining crimes. If there is any such thing as a
fundamental principle rooted in the common law, surely it must be the
notion that common law crimes and other crimes implying moral
blameworthiness require mens rea, and that the state may not exercise its
awesome punitive power to punish mere accidents.
Indeed, robust doctrines of mens rea antedated the common law, and
although there are of course cross-cultural and temporal variations, the

181 Compare Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV.

107 (suggesting constitutional limits to the legislative abolition of mens rea), with Louis
Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269,
1278-79 (1998) (calling the notion that individual blameworthiness is central to criminal law
a "myth").
Complicating the debate is the impact of punishment theory.
Some
commentators have argued that a retributionist might, in some circumstances, care less about
mens rea than a rehabilitationist. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Criminal
Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075 (1997). Though this detour is beyond
the scope of this article, we must mention here that neither of us, who count ourselves as
essentially in the retributionist camp, shares the idea that mens rea is separable from
blameworthiness. On the contrary, as we discuss infra in the text accompanying notes 307
to 311, the very idea of blameworthiness likely has its roots in our evolutionary ability to
recognize intentionality.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 140-72.
183 See supra text accompanying notes 12-19. Even after Egelhoff, some commentators
remained hopeful that the Court might breathe constitutional life into mens rea. See, e.g.,
Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court Since
Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 859 (1999). Alas, after Clark, we suggest those
hopes are dashed.
184 See supra note 14.
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notion that intentional acts deserve a different kind of response than
accidental ones seems to be a human universal. 185 Part of the confusion
about the historical-legal pedigree of mens rea is that criminal law itself is a
relatively recent invention. For most of civilization's history, the state
simply did not concern itself with what we call "crime." With a few
notable exceptions, 186 the ancient remedy for wrongs done by one person
against another was almost exclusively a matter of private revenge.1 87 Only
a small number of violations- such as treason or other wrongs directed
against the state itself-justified the attention of government. 188 Therefore,
it is misleading for commentators trying to deny the pedigree of mens rea to
argue that it is an invention of English common law, 189 when in fact the

185See Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31
HAST. L.J. 815, 996 (1980) (noting that "[wlhile Christian thought on mens rea had a
dominant influence over its development in English law, similar concepts are found in nearly
all criminal laws, often without a history of Christian influence").
186 The Code of Hammurabi, for example, not only contained a comprehensive set of
rules governing personal conduct, but also made violators of some of those rules answerable
to the state. See STANLEY A. COOK, THE LAWS OF MOSES AND THE CODE OF HAMMURABI 119 (1903). Its place in history was earned not only because of its scope and its influence on
western civilization through the Jews, but also because it was the first set of laws, and one of
only a handful of known ancient laws, to make this remedial transition from private revenge
to state-imposed punishment. Id. The Laws of Moses and the Justinian Code are two other
famous examples of law codes that continued civilization's evolution from private revenge
to state punishment. Id.; see also O.F. Robinson, Criminal Trials, in A COMPANION TO
JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES (Ernest Metzger ed., 1998). Another example was Draco's laws
from fifth-century Athens, which, in addition to their famous severity, were the first known
set of Greek laws to make homicide an offense punishable by the city-state, apparently in an
effort to curb a rise in Athenian revenge killings. See DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW
IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 42-43 (1978).
187 To be more precise, our modem distinctions between public and private, between
crime and tort, are just that-modern distinctions. See, e.g., James Lindgren, Why the
Ancients May Not Have Needed a System of CriminalLaw, 76 B.U. L. REv. 29 (1996). It is
rather remarkable to contemplate that trial by battle, which was a formalized kind of private
revenge, was not officially abolished in England until 1819, though it had, admittedly, all but
disappeared by the end of the reign of Edward III. EDWARD J. WHITE, LEGAL ANTIQUITIES
118 (1913).
188 Lindgren, supra note 187, at 39. Justinian's Code, for example, recognized only a
few crimes against the Roman public, including treason, adultery, assassination and
parricide. Id.
189 See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, CriminalLaw in a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL.
L. REv. 601, 610 n.58 (citing 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MATILAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 470-73 (2d ed. 1968)
(supporting the proposition that crimes were strict liability in England until the fifth
century)).
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development of English common law marked the emergence of English
criminal law itself-not mens rea.' 9°
Our plea that mens rea must be part of any constitutionally legitimate
criminal system is not so much an historical conclusion as a moral one. It is
simply immoral for the state to punish accidents and intentional harms the
same way. The mens rea an offender possesses expresses his or her
attitudes towards the rights and interests of fellow citizens.1 91 Different
culpable mental states justify different levels of punishment consistent with
different degrees of desert. Without mens rea, no blame and punishment
would be justified at all, at least for core crimes. The causal roots of that
immorality may be in part biological, 92 but however our concern with mens
rea began, it is now a fundamental feature of our moral practices. One need
not be a neo-Darwinist to understand that if "fundamental rights" or "selfevident principles" mean anything, they must include guarantees that the
state should satisfy its duties under the consent-to-be-governed bargain.
Neither we nor our founding or framing ancestors reasonably expected the
state to be able to punish us for accidents, any more than Holmes's dog
mistook kicks for stumbles.
Mens rea is so crucial to fair ascriptions of blame and imposition of
punishment that we are wary of attempts to dilute it by redefinitions of
elements and affirmative offenses or by evidentiary rules. Although the
criminal law, as a human institution, can never guarantee perfect justice and
must often balance competing moral and practical considerations, the risk
of error should seldom be shifted to the defendant, thus risking wrongful
conviction or wrongful conviction of a more serious crime, unless there are
supremely good reasons for doing so. The presumption should be against
redefinitions and evidentiary rules that undermine the values Winship
protects.
There are occasions when making a claim part of affirmative defenses
rather than an element of a crime may be warranted because the claim really
is an excuse, or because there are good evidentiary reasons for shifting the
burden of persuasion to the defendant. For example, New York's "extreme
emotional disturbance" doctrine addressed in Patterson is clearly a generic
partial excuse and has no necessary logical or empirical connection with
homicide. Likewise, one could argue that dissociated, act-like behaviors,
such as sleepwalking, should be treated as affirmative defenses rather than
as part of the definition of the act element because establishing whether
190 For the evolutionary roots of mens rea, we need to look much further back than the
emergence of punishing states, or even the existence of states at all. We look at those roots
in Part VI.B.
191See infra Part III.C.
192 We address this speculation in Part VI.B.
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such a state existed at the time of the crime can be extremely problematic.
Treating such cases of automatism as an affirmative defense and shifting
the burden of persuasion to the defendant, who is in the best position to
provide the evidence, might render verdicts more accurate in such cases.
Again, however, we should be wary about such rules.
B. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE
The authors of this Article disagree about the strength of the
justification for the defense of legal insanity, but we agree about the
wisdom of retaining some form of the defense.1 93 First things first: May a
state constitutionally abolish all forms of the insanity defense? Probably.
The Supreme Court noted in Clark that it has never ruled whether an
affirmative defense of legal insanity is required by due process. 194 A few
older state court opinions held abolition of the defense unconstitutional as a
violation of fundamental fairness and the right to a jury trial.' 95 More
recently, however, five states have abolished the insanity defense, and in
four of the states the state supreme court upheld the abolition.' 96 In the
fifth, the Nevada Supreme Court held that abolition violated due process
In short, the
under both the state and federal constitutions.' 97
constitutionality of abolishing the insanity defense is largely an open
question. How should it be resolved?
Insanity as an excusing condition has as formidable a history as mens
rea. 198 Forms of a recognizable insanity defense were established in
antiquity. Hale recognized the importance of legal insanity in the
seventeenth century, and when the House of Lords later adopted the
M'Naghten rules they were simply codifying what was already understood
to be the common law. 199 Some form of the insanity defense was almost
193

One of us (Morse) is a strong supporter of retaining an insanity defense in some form;

the other (Hoffman) is less enthusiastic. We agree, however, that the defense should be
retained, even if the Constitution does not require it, and that it should be defined relatively
narrowly. See infra text accompanying notes 205-06.
194 Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2721 n.20 (2006).
195 Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581 (Miss. 1931); State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020 (Wash.
1910).
196 State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840 (Kan. 2003); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995);
State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914 (Idaho 1990); State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992 (Mont. 1984).
197 Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001).
198 DANIEL N. ROBINSON, WILD BEASTS & IDLE HUMOURS: THE INSANITY DEFENSE FROM
(1996); Anthony Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins of
the "Right and Wrong" Test of CriminalResponsibility and Its Subsequent Development in
the United States: An HistoricalSurvey, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1227 (1966).
199 Platt & Diamond, supra note 198, at 1233-37. Moreover, a famous earlier case had
adopted the "product" test. Hadfield's Case, 27 Howell 1281 (1800). Isaac Ray's influential
ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT
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certainly part of the common law when the United States was founded and
was in effect in all states at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 20 0 After M'Naghten, some type of insanity defense was
universal until the 1980s. 20 1 This suggests at least a substantially deep
tradition in Anglo-American common law and in American statutes that
followed the common law. Perhaps the insanity defense is so deeply rooted
in our tradition that the Constitution requires its retention in some form.
On the other hand, despite the similarities among the states' different
approaches, there has often been profound disagreement, and even
perplexity, about the justification for the insanity defense. As a result, longstanding inquiries into cognitive and control functions have generated
varied approaches across time and jurisdictions. From time to time, as in
the wake of the unpopular Hinckley2 °2 verdict, there has been intense
criticism of the defense. 20 3 Even if the brief post-Hinckley wave of
abolition does not represent a discernable trend, perhaps there is no better
evidence that the insanity defense is not deeply rooted than the vote of five
state legislatures to abolish it. 20 4 Moreover, the language in Powell
discussing the constantly shifting tension in the criminal law's treatment of
responsibility 2°5 suggests that the Court does not believe our core traditions
require the insanity defense. That language could also be interpreted to
mean, however, that no specific form of the insanity defense is required, as
Clark held.
In any event, the constitutional pedigree of the insanity defense is an
open question, and there is no indication that the current Court will reject
the plausible argument that it is not constitutionally required. In the balance
of this section, we argue that the insanity defense should continue to be an
essential feature of any criminal justice system that claims to provide justice
1838 treatise is also indicative of the common law lineage of legal insanity. ISAAC RAY, A
TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY (1838).
200 Platt & Diamond, supra note 198, at 1248-50.
201 Id. at

1257-58.

202 United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd, 672 F.2d 115

(D.C. Cir. 1982).
203 The alleged empirical, historical, and consequential reasons for dissatisfaction with
insanity defense at the time were either empirically incorrect or analytically unsound. None
was persuasive. Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 788-801 (1985).
204 The weakness of the abolitionist arguments had been fully exposed by the time the
"wavelet" of abolition occurred. The point, however, is that the very fact that five states
have abolished the defense and four states' highest courts have upheld abolition might be a
clue about whether the insanity defense is constitutionally embedded in our deepest due
process traditions. We recognize the tautological difficulties with this argument. This
difficulty is evidence of the problematic nature of substantive due process.
205See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968).
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based on desert and blame. Indeed, we believe a robust but narrowly
defined insanity defense, and other appropriate excusing conditions, will
paradoxically help enhance the importance of mens rea and the
understanding that almost all of us are sufficiently responsible for our
actions to deserve blame and punishment if we offend.
The crucial normative question is whether it is unfair to blame and
punish a defendant who meets the definitional elements of the crime, but
whose rationality at the time of the offense was severely impaired.2 °6
Rationality is the touchstone of responsibility, as the structure of criminal
law itself indicates. All laws, criminal and civil, make sense and are
functional precisely because they provide action-guiding reasons addressed
to potentially rational creatures. We do not expect other animals to
understand the reason for a rule or the deterrent value of punishment
because other animals are not capable of the same degree of rationality as
homo sapiens. There are no chimp legislatures or avian police. It is simply
unfair to hold responsible, blame, and punish mentally disordered
wrongdoers who are not morally responsible because they were not capable
of being rational at the time of the crime.
Consider, as an analogy, the criminal responsibility of juveniles. The
common law defense of infancy conclusively presumes that children
younger than seven are not responsible and imposes a rebuttable
presumption of lack of responsibility for those between the ages of seven
and fourteen. 207 The reason for this rule, of course, is that the rational
capacities of young children are not formed, even though they may be
entirely capable of forming and acting on intentions, and even though they
might know that what they are doing is wrong. A four-year-old is perfectly
capable of intending to pocket a stick of gum, and of doing so even after his
or her parents have said that the child may not have it. We do not prosecute
the four-year-old because we understand that four-year-olds have just begun
to internalize social norms and rules, and they do not fully appreciate what
it is about the world that requires items in stores to be paid for, or indeed,
even what it means to "pay" for something.20 8

206 We refer to impairment of rational capacity generally to avoid begging the question in
favor of any particular legal insanity rule and because the dominant insanity rules involve
rationality defects.
207 LAFAVE, supra note 66, at 485-86.
208 That we do not allow the state to punish them does not of course mean they should
not be punished as a method of instruction unrelated to genuine moral desert. The whole
process of internalizing the social contract is a learning process that requires instruction and
example from the moment the infant begins to realize he or she is not the center of the
universe. But to subject individuals to state sanction, the intentional infliction of stigma and
pain, is, at least in enlightened societies, quite a different matter that requires desert.
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Driven by the same principles, the Supreme Court has held that states
may not apply their death penalties to criminally responsible capital
murderers who suffered from retardation or were under the age of eighteen
when they killed, 20 9 and they may not execute defendants convicted of
capital murder who are incompetent to be executed.1 0 In all cases, the
Court pointed to factors related to the general capacity for rationality, such
as the retarded person's "diminished capacities to understand and to process
information" and "to engage in logical reasoning,

the adolescent's "lack

of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,, 21 2 and the
incompetent capital prisoner's lack of "comprehension of why he has been
singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life"'2 13 or the prisoner's
lack of "rational understanding" that prevents him from "comprehending
the meaning and purpose of the punishment., 21 4 The Court's language and
reasoning confirm that lesser rational capacity, whether arising from normal
developmental processes or abnormalities, is the reason adolescents and
those with retardation are less responsible, and that some capital prisoners
suffering from severe mental disorder are incompetent to be executed.
The capacity for rationality can be difficult to define.21 5 However it is
conceptualized, it is clearly a continuum concept, ranging from almost none
for two-year-olds or people with profound developmental disability or
severe dementia, to fully intact for most adults with normal cognitive
development. Despite conceptual and empirical disputes about mental
disorder, a handful of severe mental disorders, those at the extreme of the
continuum of disorders, can deprive people of the capacity to act rationally.
For example, a person who delusionally believes that he is being threatened
with imminent death is incapable of rationally considering whether he
should act in self-defense. He is "rational" only in a narrow, instrumental
sense. If his psychotic premises were true, it would indeed be rational to
act in self-defense, and, in so acting, he would no doubt be acting with the
209 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (concerning defendants who were

sixteen and seventeen years of age); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2002)
(addressing people with retardation). We may not necessarily agree with the Court's
constitutional analyses in these cases, but the majority opinions in both relied heavily on
behavioral science that indicates rationality differences between late adolescents and people
with retardation compared to normal adults.
210 Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399
(1986).
211 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
212 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
213 Ford,477 U.S. at 409.
214 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2862.
215 In Panetti, after clearly adopting a "rational understanding" test, Justice Kennedy
concedes that it is difficult to define. Id. at 2873.

UNEASY ENTENTE

2007]

1119

required mens rea. Such a narrow view of responsibility is conceptually
and morally impoverished. Our hypothetical self-defender is not just
making a mistake he could correct by being more careful. He is incapable
of making a rational judgment about how to respond to the real world
because he has grossly lost touch with that world.2 16
We share critics' concerns about the reliability of insanity evidence,
and indeed have made the case here 21 7 and elsewhere 21 8 that the insanity
defense's biggest problem is that it has been "over-scienced." In the end,
unlike the mens rea inquiry, legal insanity is a legal and moral policy
judgment, not a particular empirical fact. Our justified skepticism about the
normative and even descriptive powers of psychiatry and psychology
should not lead us wrong-headedly to throw the moral and legal baby out
with the pseudo-scientific bathwater. Indeed, precisely because insanity is a
moral construct and not a scientific one, we cannot abandon it to the
scientists, especially scientists who, as we discuss below, 21 9 misguidedly
reject the possibility of individual responsibility tout court. Science may,
and should, inform our normative judgments about responsibility by
providing the best possible understanding of human behavior, but it cannot
and should not displace them.
How many people with mental disorders should be excused depends
entirely on how broadly or narrowly the insanity defense is defined and
construed. No matter how limited an insanity defense may be, some
defendants will have been so grossly out of touch with reality at the time of
the crime that an excuse is warranted because their mental disorder, as in
our example of the deluded self-defender, interferes with their rationality
even if it does not interfere with their formation of mens rea. It is precisely

216

Accord Westen, supra note 6, at 154-55.

Christopher Slobogin's "integrationist"

alternative to the insanity defense fails to make this distinction, in part because it
misunderstands the relation between negligence and mental disorder. See SLOBOGIN,
MINDING JUSTICE,

supra note 86, at 51-52; Slobogin, An End to Insanity, supra note 86, at

1202, 1240; supra note 86 and accompanying text. Providing an excuse for any defendant
who would be justified if the facts he believes were true would treat the careless and crazy
self-defender alike. This is normatively undesirable because the crazy defender is an
irrational and therefore non-responsible agent, whereas the careless defender has failed to
exercise capacities he or she possesses and thus culpably violates the rights of his or her

victim. The law convicts negligent self-defenders for murder or, in more forgiving states, of
voluntary manslaughter based on "imperfect self defense." Careless self-defenders are not
acquitted.
217 See supra text accompanying notes 164-69.
218 Morris B. Hoffman & Stephen J. Morse, The Insanity Defense Goes Back on Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, at 13; Morse, Crazy Behavior, supra note 166, at 600-26; Morse,
Crazy Reasons, supra note 57, at 189; Morse, Failed Expectations, supra note 166, at 976-

83.
219

See infra text accompanying note 267 and Part VI.
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because of this category of defendants that mens rea alone cannot do the
work necessary for a morally coherent system of criminal responsibility.
Note that if Clark were believed, he would be the rarest of the rare, a
defendant whose severe mental disorder both produced a belief entirely
inconsistent with a subjective mens rea on that occasion and undermined his
general capacity for rationality. Note also that without an insanity defense,
Clark could still be convicted of "imperfect self-defense"/voluntary
manslaughter or negligent homicide because his belief that Officer Moritz
was an alien was unreasonable. This is another important reason mens rea
alone is not enough-its broadest net (negligence) will catch people like
Clark who are not at all being "negligent" in the ordinary sense. They are
incapable of behaving more carefully because of their deluded premises,
and are thus morally innocent. It is simply unjust to blame and punish
them.
If successful insanity defenses, like those of Daniel M'Naghten and
Andrea Yates, are so infrequent, why should states even bother with
adjusting their responsibility regimens to accommodate them? 22° The
answer is that desert is a necessary justification of punishment, and the very
nature of desert and responsibility is individual. No one should be blamed
and punished unless they really deserve it, especially for core crimes.221
With only a very few doctrinal exceptions, we hold a defendant responsible
for what he and he alone did, and for what was in his mind, and his mind
alone, at the time of the doing.2 22 We do not generally attribute one
individual's actions or intentions to others. Likewise, we will consider
defenses of excuse only by applying the tests for a particular class of excuse
to an individual case. Paranoid schizophrenics, as a group, are of course
not necessarily excused from all criminal responsibility, but neither should
they, as a group, necessarily be deemed always responsible.
As long as we agree that there might be some individuals who are
perfectly capable of executing instrumentally rational intentions based on a
profoundly irrational, mentally disordered loss of reality, mens rea alone

220 Morse, supra note 203, at 795-801.
221 C.S. Lewis made this point elegantly:
What can be more immoral than to inflict suffering on me for the sake of deterring others if I do
not deserve it? And what can be more outrageous than to catch me and submit me to a
disagreeable process of moral improvement without my consent, unless (once more) I deserve it?
C.S. LEWIs, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 91-92 (1940).
222

Genuine non-culpable ignorance of law, conspiracy, and felony-murder are counter-

examples that stretch this principle of individual responsibility, but these doctrines are
justified on purely consequential grounds and are considered exceptions to the principle in

the text.
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will never be enough. Our legal system has a moral duty to identify those
people and to let jurors consider whether their crimes should be excused.223
C. ALTERNATIVES TO ABOLITION
In this Part, we address four alternatives to the insanity defense: the
mens rea approach that limits admission of mental abnormality evidence
solely to the issue of mens rea formation; using mental abnormality
evidence at sentencing; the "guilty but mentally ill" verdict; and a recent
academic proposal for an "integrationist" approach to abolition that bears
much similarity to the mens rea approach. We reject all four.
The mens rea approach, adopted in the four states that have abolished
the insanity defense, is precisely the opposite of the Arizona rules that the
Court approved in Clark: The insanity defense is abolished but the
defendant is permitted to use evidence of mental disorder to negate the
mens rea requirement of the state's prima facie case. This approach is
fundamentally unfair, however, for precisely the reasons given in the
preceding section and in Part III discussing the relation between mental
disorder and criminal responsibility. In virtually all cases, even severely
disordered defendants who are grossly out of touch with reality will form
mens rea and will be convicted. Even if all subjective mens reas are
negated, the defendant will still be convicted for crimes in which negligence
suffices because crazy perceptions or beliefs are by definition unreasonable.
This is a bizarre result. In short, an insanity defense is necessary for the
criminal law to make coherent, fair assessments of blameworthiness.
A second alternative to abolishing legal insanity as an excusing
defense is to limit consideration of mental disorders to sentencing. This is a
kind of sentencing version of the evidentiary channeling criticized above.224
This alternative blurs the distinction between crime and punishment, and
thus between blameworthiness and blame. Excusing conditions like
insanity are excusing conditions precisely because they are deemed
inconsistent with blameworthiness. They are defenses to the crime itself,
not mitigating facts. Convicting morally innocent agents-such as the
We are not suggesting, for example, that all religious extremists who crash airplanes
into buildings should necessarily be excused from their behavior because their extremism is
a form of "loss of reality." See Stephen J. Morse, The Jurisprudenceof Craziness, in THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 225, 256-58 (F. Parisi & V. Smith, eds.,
2005) (considering the distinction between irrational and rational terrorists). Here again, the
command of a just rule of law is to consider cases individually, to allow individual members
of such groups the chance to prove they are suffering from a recognized mental disease so
profound that they lost touch with reality, and then let reasonable jurors decide. There is
much evil in the world whose name is not insanity-but there is some whose is.
224 See supra text accompanying notes 165-73.
223
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Model Penal Code's lemon squeezer 22 5 --cannot be acceptable in any
system of criminal responsibility that claims to be based on individual
blameworthiness.
Moreover, moving mental state issues from affirriative defenses to
sentencing changes the decision-maker from jury to judge, at least in the
vast majority of states and the federal system, where juries play no role in
sentencing. Yet, as we have argued throughout this Article, the insanity
inquiry is not scientific, or even primarily factual; it is a normative question
about an individual's rational capacity and his or her resultant responsibility
for breach of the social contract. This is a moral question best answered by
ordinary people, not judges or mental health experts. Finally, because
sentencing is largely discretionary, there is no guarantee that the appropriate
role of mental abnormality will be considered or that individual sentencing
judges will calibrate punishment properly even if they do take mental
abnormality into account. Juries may not always make wise decisions in
legal insanity cases, but the existence of the insanity defense will at least
guarantee that mental abnormality is considered in appropriate cases.
The third modem alternative to abolishing the insanity defense is the
"guilty but mentally ill" verdict ("GBMI"), which has been adopted by a
substantial minority of states.226 Unlike the sentencing alternative, which
considers potential diminished responsibility after the defendant has been
authoritatively labeled blameworthy and responsible by a guilty verdict,
GBMI has nothing to do with responsibility. In fact, the convicted GBMI
defendant is found fully culpable and there is no reduction in sentence.22 7 A
GBMI capital murderer can be executed.228 Moreover, GBMI is not a
treatment tool, since mental health evaluations and treatment are routine
parts of health care in every prison system. Besides, when a GBMI convict
is hospitalized and successfully treated, he is then returned to prison to
complete his sentence, just like any other convict.
In short, GBMI is a politically expedient "third-way" fraud. It has
nothing to do with responsibility and nothing to do with treatment. It is the
equivalent of a verdict of "guilty but herpes," with no guarantee that the
herpes will be treated or even noticed once the defendant leaves the
courtroom. Its only purpose is to give legislatures political cover and to lull
jurors into mistakenly believing their GBMI verdicts might mean that
defendants with mental disorder who receive this verdict will be given

supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2721 (2006).

225 See
226

227 RALPH REISNER, CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & ARTI RAI, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH

ed. 2004).
228 People v. Crews, 522 N.E.2d 1167 (Il1. 1988).

SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 610-11 (4th
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special treatment and attention, or otherwise dealt with more mercifully at
sentencing or in prison.
The fourth and final alternative we wish to consider is Professor
Christopher Slobogin's proposed "integrationist" alternative to the insanity
defense, which is the only reasoned, contemporary scholarly proposal for
abolition of which we are aware.229 Professor Slobogin provides a critique
of the present insanity defense as a crucial ground of justification for his
abolitionist proposal. We therefore present a response to that critique,
focusing particularly on Professor Slobogin's criticism of irrationality tests
for legal insanity because these tests play a large role in our justification for
the legal insanity defense.2 3 ° We then turn to the proposal itself.
Professor Slobogin accuses the dominant formulations of the insanity
defense of being "overbroad ' 23' and unable accurately to identify those
defendants who are sufficiently irrational to be excused,23 2 apparently
because the tests can be interpreted to excuse more people than he believes
normatively deserve an excuse. He also claims that the dominant insanity
tests are "whimsical" because they allegedly permit the defendant to define
the scope of the excuse 233 and because the justification for convicting
mentally disordered people with lesser rationality problems but acquitting
those with severe rationality problems is "often weak., 234 He wonders why
irrationality is an excusing condition at all. 235
Professor Slobogin's criticisms betray a misunderstanding of the
justifications for this standard and for the insanity defense in general. He
criticizes the argument for a rationality-based justification (including one
based on "appreciation") by suggesting that there is little reason to believe
that severe mental disorder makes it difficult for sufferers to access and be
guided by good reason. 6 He draws an analogy to the difficulty proponents
229 See SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE, supra note 86; Slobogin, An End to Insanity, supra

note 86. Although Professor Slobogin's argument does not change, we will focus here on
the most recent, somewhat expanded version in MINDING JUSTICE.

We are grateful to

Professor Slobogin for a substantive and courteous discussion of our analysis of his proposal
that has clarified and sharpened our thinking.
230 Professor Slobogin's critique appears in some places to understand that determinism
and "mechanical" causation by factors outside one's control are not the justifications for
legal insanity.

SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE, supra note 86, at 40.

His discussion

nevertheless often conflates these alleged justifications with genuine justifications. Id. at 39.
231 Id. at 24.
232 Id. at 50.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 38.
235 Id. at 46.

236 Id. at 47.

He criticizes an appreciation test for insanity by confusing statistical

predictability with a practical reasoning excuse. See id. at 44 (noting that people with
psychoses are less dangerous than is usually believed).
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of a control test have when trying to demonstrate that severe disorder makes
self-control difficult, 237 and suggests that the reasoning ability of people

with severe mental disorder may not be substantially impaired.238
This argument fails to understand the rationality test properly. The
responsibility-diminishing mental state in rationality tests consists of crazy
perceptions and beliefs that are not a result of carelessness and not
correctable by reason or evidence. They are the product of some abnormal
process. The person suffering from such cognitive distortions may have
intact reasoning otherwise, but if one's premises in practical reason are
uncorrectably irrational, then the agent is incapable by definition of acting
rationally in that situation. Severe mental disorder simply is the inability to
access good reason in the context in which the disorder is operative. This
also explains why the analogy to control problems is faulty: mental disorder
is not lack of control; it is lack of rationality.
Professor Slobogin's argument about overbreadth confuses causation
with excuse. All behavior is caused by the necessary and sufficient
variables that produce it. Other factors, such as poverty, may play a
stronger causal role in crime than mental disorder, but causation per se is
not an excusing condition. 239 Lack of rational capacity, not causation by
some factor, is why people are excused and thus there is no danger of
overbreadth by excusing defendants whose criminal behavior was produced
by more causally powerful variables than mental disorder. Failure to
understand this point was the central flaw in prior proposals for abolition in
the wake of the Hinckley acquittal.2 4 °
How broad or narrow an excuse should be is a central normative
question. It is not a valid criticism of any insanity formulation to note
(correctly) that it may be interpreted too broadly or narrowly for a particular
critic's taste. All tests can be misinterpreted, and one's position on the
normative issue of culpability requires a normative construction, not a
prescriptive broadside. We have already explained why the nature of law
237 Id. at 47, 49. We share Professor Slobogin's opposition to control tests that are
independent of rationality tests, but we do not share the grounds for this opposition. In
particular, Professor Slobogin criticizes the "volitional" test by characterizing it as if

causation and lack of control were equivalent, but this is a caricature of an adequate control
test rather than an attempt to come to grips with its best form and justification. Id. at 39-41.
23 Id. at 48-49.
239 Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1592-94 (1994).
240 See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 61-63 (1982).

Professor Morris's argument heavily influenced the widely noted but equally misguided
abolitionist proposal by the American Medical Association. Board of Trustees, Am. Med.
Ass'n, Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials and Limitations of Psychiatric Testimony, 251 J.
AM. MED. Ass'N 2967 (1984). Both were criticized on these grounds. Morse, supra note
203, at 788-97.
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itself supports the view that rationality must be the primary responsibility
condition and irrationality the primary excusing condition in both criminal
and civil law. 241 Professor Slobogin does not embed his critique in a
concept of the person or a jurisprudence of responsibility and he gives us no
moral reason to prefer his outcome to the current system. Moreover, his
242
test suffers from the same line-drawing problems as any other test.

Identifying the right people to excuse as legally insane is an admittedly
difficult enterprise, but it is no more difficult than many other line-drawing
decisions that criminal law must make. The virtue of the irrationality
standard is that it provides an anchor for a meaningful normative debate,
and avoids the confusion of thinking that causation or determinism is the
basis of the excuse or that causation is the equivalent of compulsion. 243 It
does not permit the defendant to define the scope of the excuse. The finder
of fact must still decide if the defendant's rationality was sufficiently
impaired to meet the standard for the insanity defense.
Professor Slobogin's analogies between those suffering from severe
cognitive abnormalities and others who do not, such as gang members or
those with dependent personalities,244 are neither apt nor useful. All people,
including people with severe mental disorders, have reasons for action, for
doing what they do. Likewise, all people can have their capacity for
rationality compromised by anything from fleeting emotions to profound
and persistent delusions. At some point, sufficient irrationality deprives
people of moral agency. Of course, as Professor Slobogin notes, if
irrationality does not sufficiently affect the agent's reason for committing
the crime, no excuse is warranted,245 but the irrationality standard best
explains why this is so.

241See supra text accompanying note 206.
242 For

example, suppose, in the absence of a threat for failure to comply, a defendant

hallucinates God's command to do a criminal deed or delusionally believes that God wishes
him or her to commit the crime. If these facts were true, what would be the legal outcome?
Justification, excuse, or neither? Cf SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE, supra note 86, at 27.
Alternatively, suppose a delusional defendant believes that his life is in deadly danger, but,
unknown to the defendant, he is about to be the victim of his believed aggressor and would
have had a right to defend himself if he had actually known the facts. Suppose such a
defendant were not deluded. Should he be justified, excused, or neither?
243 Professor Slobogin's attempt to analogize the difficulties besetting rationality and
volitional assessments is marred by a failure to understand the difference between the nature
of the cognitive and volitional phenomena being assessed and by a confusion between
mechanical causation and causation by practical reason. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, MINDING
JUSTICE, supra note 86, at 47, 50.
244 Id. at 50.
245

Id.
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Professor Slobogin also criticizes a rationality test because it might
excuse psychopaths or pedophiles. 246 Such people are of course not
popular, and public opinion and current law do not excuse them. The
argument fails to confront a genuine practical reasoning approach to these
conditions, however, and there are very good arguments for questioning the
responsibility of some people with these conditions on grounds of impaired
rationality.247 Professor's Slobogin's criticism here borrows from his
criticism of "volitional" standards, but the argument depends on a
misunderstanding of volitional problems and the implicit confusion of
causes and reasons. Virtually all philosophers who have addressed the
issue argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible. Legal and moral
responsibility may be treated differently, but if one believes that the law
should not blame and punish those who are not morally responsible, there is
a strong case for excusing some psychopaths. Indeed, Professor Slobogin is
internally inconsistent because he earlier suggests that people who cannot
understand the concepts of good and evil (i.e., psychopaths, although he
does not use this term) would be excused under his proposal.248 Finally, as
we discuss further below, 249 unless Professor Slobogin were to accept an

irrationality justification, he lacks the resources to justify his claim that
older adolescents and people with retardation deserve mitigation of
punishment.
We are unpersuaded by Professor Slobogin's critique of the current
insanity defense in general and of the irrationality justification in particular.
The irrationality justification best explains positive criminal (and civil)
mental health law and it is profoundly normatively defensible. We
therefore believe that Professor Slobogin's integrationist proposal can only
succeed if it meets the heavy burden of showing that it is more just and
more workable than the present defense of legal insanity. We conclude
that, in practice, the positive integrationist proposal will not provide the
proper terms for evaluating blameworthiness and will not produce justice.
246

Id. at 42, 51.

247

See SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON 120-21 (1990) (arguing that those who

lack the ability to be receptive to the Good-e.g., some psychopaths-are criminally insane);
Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics and Criminal Responsibility, 69 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 160, 190-95 (2006) (providing such an account for addicts, but ultimately rejecting
an excuse in most cases because most addicts can be held diachronously responsible). One
of us (Morse) believes that severe psychopathy should qualify for an excuse (and postacquittal commitment); the other (Hoffman) is not sure.
248 SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE, supra note 86, at 27. In another part of his argument,
however, Professor Slobogin says that psychopaths should be held responsible. Id. at 42.
The apparent inconsistency can only be explained by differing definitions of knowledge or
understanding.
249 See infra p. 1132.
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Here is the integrationist proposal itself:
A person shall be excused from an offense if at the time of the offense [by reason of
mental disease or defect] he (a) lacked the subjective mental state of the conduct
circumstances, or result element of the crime; (b) believed circumstances existed that,
if true, would have justified the offense; (c) believed circumstances existed that, if
true, would have amounted to duress; or (d) was unaware of the general prohibitions
of the criminal law ....

Professor Slobogin essentially proposes that the same defenses that apply to
other criminal defendants would be applied to defendants with mental
illness and there would be no independent insanity defense. He places
mental disease and defect in brackets to indicate that the language need not
be part of the test.
The logic of the proposal is that mental abnormality should not be
required, but this exposes an immediate analytical and normative difficulty.
Defendants without mental abnormality who make mistakes about
justifying or excusing conditions are not judged according to the facts and
They are held
circumstances they mistakenly believed were true.
responsible for their errors. For example, depending on the jurisdiction, a
negligent self-defender who honestly but unreasonably believes he needs to
use deadly force to save his own life will be deprived of the defense
altogether, or he will be convicted of manslaughter on a theory of imperfect
self-defense theory or of negligent homicide. Under current law it would be
unthinkable to excuse a self-defender who makes a grossly unreasonable
mistake. This is precisely what Professor Slobogin's proposal requires,
however, unless he limits the proposal to those suffering from a mental
abnormality. If he limits the proposal to abnormal defendants to avoid the
undesirable result of excusing a grossly negligent defendant, then he is
implicitly conceding that there is something special about mental disorder
and he must say what that is and why it requires special treatment. Of
course, there is something special about mental disorder. It deprives people
of rationality through no fault of their own and thus distinguishes them
from simply careless people. Thus, the integrationist proposal either leads
to undesirable excuses for normal defendants or it implicitly provides a
special defense of legal insanity.
250 SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE, supra note 86, at 56. Professor Slobogin would deny
the defendant this defense if the defendant were responsible for having the erroneous beliefs
because the person had purposely avoided treatment with the awareness that such beliefs
would occur without treatment. Id. We largely agree that defendants who culpably create
their own excusing condition should not be excused.
We also agree for the reasons given in Parts III and IV.C that defendants should be
permitted to use evidence of mental abnormality to negate mens rea and that full negation
will seldom occur. Our disagreement and discussion will be limited to the affirmative
defense parts of the proposal.
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Professor Slobogin tries to avoid this problem by claiming that that the
doctrines of justification and negligence have largely been subjectivized.
He proposes that defendants whose wrong beliefs about reality arise from
psychotic states should be treated the same as those whose errors result
from culpable (unreasonable) carelessness or inattention. He is incorrect
about the extent of subjectivization current law accepts. As we have
already seen, the Model Penal Code does not adopt the subjectivized view
of negligence that Professor Slobogin claims for it.2 51

Even the most

individualized of all the Model Penal Code's formulations, the extreme
mental and emotional disturbance doctrine that reduces murder to
manslaughter, has not been interpreted as fully subjective and it has met
with little acceptance in American law, even when limited.252 Moreover,
Anglo-American law's most thoroughly subjectivized "reasonable person"
standard, adopted by the House of Lords in the context of the
provocation/passion reduction of murder to manslaughter,2 53 has now been
abandoned because it was incoherent.2 54 A fully subjectivized reasonable
person standard is incoherent because it is not a reasonable person standard
at all. The reasonable abnormal person is simply not reasonable. 255
Professor Slobogin's proposal requires abandoning objective standards
for negligence, justification, and the partially objective standard for duress.
Professor Slobogin is perfectly entitled to propose and argue for the
desirability of such a radical change in our law, but he does not provide an
argument for thoroughgoing subjectivization of the criteria for justification
and negligence. Indeed, he accepts the objective standard for what facts
would qualify for justification or duress, but he never explains why he is
willing to accept a fully subjective standard for evaluating the
reasonableness of mistakes.
To exonerate a culpably careless wrongdoer the same as a deluded
wrongdoer makes a mockery of the moral differences between them. The
culpably careless have the capacity to pay attention and to be as careful as
we expect them to be, yet they have not exercised that capacity. They have
failed to respect the rights and interests of their victims. Such failure is the
essence of blameworthiness in our system of morality and law. Delusional

251
252

253
254

See supra note 85.
See KADISH ETAL., supra note 10, at 405.
Regina v. Smith [2001] 1 A.C. 146 (H.L.).
Attorney General for Jersey v. Holley [2005] 2 A.C. 580 (P.C.). Holley is a Privy

Council decision that technically does not bind the House of Lords, but many of the same
judges serve on both courts and it is widely believed that the Lords will follow suit.
255 See John Gardner & Timothy Macklen, Compassion Without Respect: Nine Fallacies
in R. v. Smith, [2001] CM. L. REv. 623 (explaining the incoherence of a fully subjective
reasonable person standard).
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defendants, on the other hand, have not simply made a mistake that could
have been corrected by being more careful. They are incapable of getting
the facts right because they are deluded. They are quintessentially
blameless in our system of morality and law. 56
The integrationist approach also does not have adequate resources to
address the familiar and frequent case of psychotic mental states with
religious content, such as hallucinating that one is hearing God's voice or
delusionally believing that God wants the person to behave in some way.
Suppose that there is no apparent threat to the agent, who simply believes
that he is doing God's will. Such a person would not be justified under
traditional criminal law, even if the facts and circumstances were as the
agent believed. The standard for the balance of evils part of the residual
"choice of evils" justification is purely objective and is a strict liability
criterion. 57 Moreover, in some jurisdictions the agent may be convicted of
a crime of negligence for negligently misappraising the situation. There is
no subjectivization of the reasonable person standard. 8 Indeed, Professor
Slobogin generally accepts the objective part of justification because
subsection (b) of his proposal acquits the defendant only if the defendant
would objectively be justified if the facts the defendant believed to be true
were in fact true. Thus, Professor Slobogin would have to convict these
types of defendants.
For example, under Professor Slobogin's integrationist approach,
Andrea Yates should be convicted of negligent homicide for the deaths of
her children.
Professor Slobogin says that her mistaken beliefs
"presumably would have been found to justify her criminal conduct,, 259 but
this conclusion is simply incorrect as a matter of positive law, even if the
facts and circumstances had been as Ms. Yates believed and even if she
were not responsible for causing the condition of her own excuse.
Some agents, such as Ms. Yates, act for such irrational reasons that it
would be unjust to blame and punish them whether or not they would be
justified if the facts and circumstances were as they delusionally believed.
In some cases it can be difficult to determine whether a person motivated by
religious beliefs is psychotic, but this is no reason not to try to achieve
justice. Nitpicking about whether they would have been legally justified if
the facts and circumstances had been as they believed indicates the
necessity for narrow legalistic interpretation, which seems beside the moral
point in these cases.
256

Indeed, they would be excused under the "insane delusion" part of the M'Naghten

rules, so the integrationist approach is not needed for these defendants.
257 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.02(l)(a) at 12 (1985).
258

Id. at 13 (referring to sec. 3.02(2)).
MINDING JUSTICE, supra note 86, at 25, 53-54.

259 SLOBOGIN,
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Consider the Yates case again. Suppose, counterfactually, that Ms.
Yates would have succeeded with the choice of evils justification if the
facts she believed were true. Should we excuse her because the law should
hold that it is better children should die than be tormented in hell for
eternity-in which case she would be excused under the "insane delusion"
part of M'Naghten and no integrationist approach is required-or because
Ms. Yates was an irrational agent at the time of the homicide? Again, is it
morally and legally sensible to be arguing what the right legal result should
be if bizarre facts were true, or should we instead be focusing on the
defendant's rational capacity as manifested by her abnormal, bizarre
motivating beliefs? Yates may be a sympathetic defendant, but she would
have a much better chance of being excused under a sensible interpretation
of a cognitive insanity defense than under the integrationist approach. To
be consistent, the integrationist approach could try to subjectivize the
"choice of evils" justification, but this standard would permit defendants to
define the scope of their own excuse, a charge Professor Slobogin wrongly
levels at rationality tests.260
The integrationist approach would also excuse a defendant if duress
would have obtained if the facts and circumstances the defendant believed
were true. Such cases are clinically rare, but the objection is similar to the
objection to the integrationist "justification" standard. If a defendant were
negligent in estimating whether he is in such a situation, the defense would
be unavailable for crimes requiring negligence as the mens rea, and in many
jurisdictions it might not be available at all. Either the duress standard must
be entirely subjectivized for both mentally normal and abnormal
defendants-an undesirable legal outcome because it would acquit many
culpable, mentally normal defendants-or the legal distinction between
mentally normal and abnormal defendants must be preserved.
The final part of the integrationist proposal would excuse a defendant
who acted under a "general ignorance of law," by which Professor Slobogin
means agents who may not be aware of the concept of crime or who cannot
understand the concept of good and evil. 261 Virtually no normal defendant
could sustain such a claim, and, among those with mental abnormalities, as
a clinical matter, only psychopaths might be able to do so. Some deluded
defendants may have entirely irrational views about the parameters of crime
or of the concepts of good and evil, but few abnormal defendants other than
psychopaths lack all understanding of these concepts. Professor Slobogin
criticizes irrationality tests for insanity as potentially excusing

260 Id. at 50.
261 Id. at 27.
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psychopaths, 262 but the integrationist263approach will also excuse some
psychopaths, as he himself recognizes.
Applied to psychopaths, this is not really an "integrationist" proposal
at all because it affects only mentally abnormal defendants. It is in fact a
form of legal insanity defense, but it is not the best approach to these cases.
The best reason to excuse psychopaths, if they should be excused at all, is
not a "general ignorance of law" defense. The better justification is that
psychopaths lack the capacities-empathy and guilt-that are the primary
tools rational agents use to give them good reason not to harm others
unjustifiably. They are irrational in that respect. If we wish to excuse
psychopaths-and many do not-an interpretation of the insanity defense
that permits this result is the most morally precise and common sense
approach.
Finally, there is a fundamental inconsistency in Professor Slobogin's
"integrationist" approach. He applauds the Supreme Court decisions
categorically barring execution of capital murderers who were retarded or
sixteen and seventeen years old at the time of the crime, 264 and argues that it
would be unconstitutional to execute defendants who suffered from mental
disorder at the time of the crime.265 He also argues that mental abnormality
should be a mitigating factor in sentencing generally. His primary rationale
for these positions is that mental abnormality diminishes the defendant's
rationality, and that such abnormality-based diminished rationality can be
reasonably assessed. Just so. Professor Slobogin thus concedes that
irrationality is the primary mitigating and excusing condition, but, of
course, lack of rational capacity is a continuum. If a substantial lack of
rational capacity mitigates responsibility for purposes of just punishment,
Professor Slobogin provides no reason to deny that extreme irrationality
should excuse altogether.266
A suitably drafted and interpreted insanity defense addresses the
fundamental excusing condition of irrationality and provides more just
results than the integrationist call for legalistic and occasionally bizarre
decision making criteria. The integrationist proposal is neither more just
nor more workable than a properly circumscribed defense of legal insanity.
Id. at 42-44, 5 1.
at 82 (making this point in a later chapter addressing the death penalty). Professor
Slobogin claims to have recognized this point in his earlier chapter on the insanity defense,
but the citation is to an article by a different scholar, and contrary to Professor Slobogin's
later claims, all discussion of psychopathy in the insanity defense chapter strongly implies
that psychopaths should not be excused.
264 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
262

263 Id.

265

SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE, supra note 86, at 64-83.

266

Id. at 75-77.
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VI. THE FUTURE OF MENS REA AND LEGAL INSANITY
We hope we have demonstrated the critical importance, if not
necessarily the constitutional pedigree, of both mens rea and legal insanity
to any morally coherent system of criminal justice, and the unfairness and
unworkability of alternatives. Two problems still remain. First, there are
those-both in law and science-who claim that the moral premises of
criminal responsibility are quaint and unscientific remnants of a bygone era,
and that advances in neuroscience are dissolving notions of
blameworthiness into meaninglessness. 267 Second, even if we successfully
resist this physicalist and determinist onslaught, where does that leave
moralists? What are the foundations of a morally grounded theory of
criminal responsibility?
A. THE GENERAL CHALLENGE TO RESPONSIBILITY
Scientific, physicalist theories of the mind threaten our deeply held
presumptions of intentionality and personhood and thus threaten our
responsibility concepts and practices. What is happening when we "act"?
What is happening when we "intend" to act? What is happening when we
subjectively feel and report that we are apparently unable to "control" our
acts? Until relatively recently, these questions largely inhabited the halls of
philosophy and speculation. These problems were technically daunting
because accessing brain structure and processes was generally rudimentary
or impossible. Advances in technology now allow brain imaging that can
measure the electrical and heat-producing activities of single neurons
during an individual's designated activity and the accumulated mapping of
that neural activity over time and over many subjects. As a result,
neuroscientists announce almost daily that certain activities seem to be
associated with certain areas in the brain, and that new levels of functional
interconnectedness between different parts of the brain have been
discovered.268

267

See, e.g., Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes

Nothing and Everything, in LAW & THE BRAIN 207 (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds.,
2006); Robert Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the CriminalJustice System, in LAW AND
THE BRAIN, supra.

268 See, e.g., B. Knutson et al., Neural Predictorsof Purchases, 53 NEURON 147 (2007)
(noting that the questions shoppers ask themselves-how much they want an object and how
much they are willing to pay for it-are associated with activity in specific parts of the
brain). As is so often the case, the media quickly and breathlessly pick up the story, most
often concluding or implying that the shopper is therefore not responsible for the activity in
question. See, e.g., John Tierney, The Voices in My Head Say "Buy It! " Why Argue?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2007, at Fl. In other words, we are not brains in a vat; we are brains in a
mall.
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Some people, including many neuroscientists, think that these
discoveries are leading inexorably to a mechanistic, deterministic view of
the brain, and thus to a mechanistic, deterministic view of human behavior
in which conscious intentionality plays no role. Daniel M'Naghten did not
shoot that gun; it was his finger that pulled the trigger, and his peripheral
neurons that caused his finger muscles to contract, and central neurons that
caused the peripheral neurons to fire, and neurons to activate neurons all the
way down. M'Naghten's intentions did no work in explaining his action.
These are the alleged implications of scientific advances in the
understanding of human behavior that terrify many thinking people.
The seriousness of the potential challenge to the traditional
foundations of law and morality from behavioral and neuroscience is best
summed up in the title of an eminent psychologist's recent book, The
Illusion of Conscious Will.269 Its thesis, stated most extremely, is that we
delude ourselves when we think that our intentions are genuinely causal.27 °
The rich explanatory apparatus of intentionality is simply a post-hoc
rationalization that we hapless homo sapiens construct to explain what our
brains have already done. We are just mechanisms, although the illusion of
conscious will may play a positive role in our lives. 271 The evidence for
these assertions is not all based on neuroscientific findings, and the claim
that we are purely mechanisms has long been thought to follow from all

269 DANIEL WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL

(2002).

270

Id. at 3, 341-42.

271

Here is an extensive quotation from the conclusion of Professor Wegner's book,

which is necessary to obtain the tenor of the assertion and to evaluate if it is internally
logical:
Sometimes how things seem is more important than what they are. This is true in theater, in art,
in used car sales, in economics, and-it now turns out-in the scientific analysis of conscious
will. The fact is, it seems to each of that we have a conscious will. It seems we have selves. It
seems we have minds. It seems we are agents. It seems we cause what we do. Although it is
sobering and ultimately accurate to call all this an illusion, it is a mistake to conclude that the
illusory is trivial. On the contrary, the illusions piled atop apparent mental causation are the
building blocks of human psychology and social life. It is only with the feeling of conscious will
that we can begin to solve the problem of knowing who we are as individuals, of discerning what
we can and cannot do, and of judging ourselves morally right or wrong for what we have done.
Id. at 341-42.
In more recent work, Professor Wegner appears to have softened the radical
interpretation of his claim, which is that we, as persons or agents, are not really "controllers"
whose mental processes cause action. Daniel M. Wegner, Who Is the Controller of
Controlled Processes?, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS 19, 32 (Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman
& John A. Bargh eds., 2005) ("The theory is mute on whether thought does cause action.").
On the other hand, Professor Wegner seems ambivalent and loathe to abandon the radical
interpretation. Id. at 27 (arguing that the experience of conscious will is "normally a
construction" and referring to mental causation as "apparent").
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physicalist, naturalist, scientific views of the person, but neuroscience is the
source of the most profound challenge today.
If this particular physicalist and determinist view of humans is correct
that we are really not acting agents at all, the present foundations of law and
morality rooted in agentic personhood would collapse.
If scientific
investigation can demonstrate that the alleged criteria for personhood
cannot be satisfied by people as they really are constituted, the criminal
law's central tenet that individuals are personally responsible for their
behavior would disappear.
But don't fret.
This collapse-which
physicalists have been predicting for centuries-is not imminent. Advances
in neuroscience and related fields have revealed hitherto unimagined
biological causes that predispose people to behave as they do,272 but the
science typically supporting the more general and radical claim that
conscious will is an illusion-that we do not act and therefore cannot be
responsible-is either insufficient empirically or does not have the
implications claimed.2 73
To begin, it is important to recognize that the new challenge to
conscious intentionality is distinguishable from the more familiar general
challenge to responsibility that determinism or causation generally presents.
Even if determinism is true, we may well be the types of creatures we take
ourselves to be-usually conscious, potentially rational creatures whose

272

Recently published issues of prestigious journals contain illustrative examples of

advances in scientific understanding of the causes of legally relevant behavior. See, e.g.,
Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in MaltreatedChildren,
297 SCIENCE 851 (2002) (reporting that maltreated male children were more likely to exhibit
antisocial behavior if they had a defect in the genotype that confers high levels of the
neurotransmitter encoding enzyme monoamine oxidase A, which metabolizes various
neurotransmitters linked to violence if the levels of those neurotransmitters are low); Rita Z.
Goldstein & Nora D. Volkow, Drug Addiction and Its Underlying NeurobiologicalBasis:
Neuroimaging Evidence for the Involvement of the FrontalCortex, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1642 (2002) (finding addiction involves cortical processes that result in the overvaluation of
drug reinforcers, the undervaluation of other reinforcers, and defective inhibitory control of
responses to drugs); J. Kim-Cohen et al., MAOA, Maltreatment, and Gene-Environment
Interaction Predicting Children's Mental Health: New Evidence and a Meta-Analysis, 11
MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 903 (2006) (discussing how the MAOA gene influences
vulnerability to environmental stress, such as childhood maltreatment); Marc N. Potenza et
al., Gambling Urges in PathologicalGambling: A FunctionalMagnetic Resonance Imaging
Study, 60 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 828, 828 (2003) (reporting that male
pathological gamblers "demonstrate relatively decreased activity in brain regions implicated
in impulse regulation compared with controls" when viewing gambling cues); Murray B.
Stein et al., Genetic and EnvironmentalInfluences on Trauma Exposure and Posttraumatic
Stress DisorderSymptoms: A Twin Study, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1675 (2002) (concluding
that genetic factors can influence the risk of exposure to assaultive trauma and to posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms that may ensue).
273 See infra text accompanying notes 276-303.
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behavior is explained by our intentions. Assuming that the truth of
determinism is logically inconsistent with responsibility tout court-a
controversial position in the philosophy of responsibility-we can never
discover if determinism is true. Moreover, there is a respectable core
position in the philosophy of responsibility-"compatibilism"-that holds
that determinism is not inconsistent with responsibility. 274 The legal system
is in any event unlikely to abandon responsibility altogether based on a
speculative metaphysical thesis. We therefore do not discuss the general
deterministic challenge to responsibility.
It is important to recognize, however, that simply discovering a cause
for behavior, whether it is biological, psychological or sociological, does
not mean that the agent is not responsible for the behavior. All behavior
has causes. If causation were an excuse, no one could ever be held
responsible for any behavior. One of us has called the confused, pernicious
belief that causation excuses, which is used selectively and all too
This error is
frequently, the "fundamental psycholegal error. '' 275
conceptually identical to the misguided belief that determinism excuses in
our positive law.
On the other hand, science may in fact be able to demonstrate that we
are not the types of intentional agents that we think we are, and thus that
responsibility ascriptions and all that follows from them-including
If these doubts are accurate,
criminal desert-are unjustifiable.
compatibilism cannot save responsibility because responsibility depends on
agency and the new discoveries arguably deny the possibility of agency as
it is traditionally conceived. We therefore limit ourselves to addressing this
form of a general radical challenge to responsibility because it is at least
demonstrable in principle.276
Physicalism's relentless gnawing at the role of conscious intentionality
is neither new nor restricted to science. The philosophy of mind and action
has long contained arguments for various forms of physical reductionism
and for eliminative materialism. 277 Both types of conceptual views existed
long before recent discoveries in neuroscience and psychology deepened
274 Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results and CriminalResponsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv.
363, 437 nn.207-08.
275 Morse, supra note 239, at 1592-94.
276 See generally Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Responsibility and the Disappearing
Person, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 2545 (2007) (addressing the two general challenges to
responsibility and concluding neither poses a threat at present).
277 Reductive accounts hold, simply, that mental states are as they seem to us, but that
they are identical to brain states. Eliminative accounts hold that our beliefs about our mental
states are radically false and, consequently, that no match between brain states and mental
states is possible. See PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 26-34, 43-49
(Rev. ed. 1988) (explaining the arguments for and against both types of accounts).
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our understanding of how the brain and nervous system are constructed and
work. Both types of views are extremely controversial.
Most philosophers of mind believe that complete reduction of mind to
biophysical explanation is impossible.27 Until the conceptual revolution
that allows us to solve the mind-body problem occurs-and, at present, we
have no idea how the brain enables the mind 279-science cannot resolve the
debate, although it can furnish support for various conceptual arguments.
At present, and for the foreseeable future, we have no convincing
conceptual reason from the philosophy of mind, even when it is completely
informed by the most recent neuroscience, to abandon our view of
ourselves as creatures with causally efficacious mental states.28 °
Even if we cannot solve the mind-body problem, however, and thus
determine if reductive accounts are true, it is possible that we might make
empirical discoveries indicating that some parts of our ordinary
understanding about action and agency are incorrect.
Much recent
argument based on current neuroscience and psychology takes this position,
arguing that mental causation does not exist as we think it does. For ease of
exposition, we label these approaches the "no action thesis" ("NAT"), as a
way of describing their ultimate conclusion that the notion of human
"action" is a neurological artifact of consciousness. The logic of these
arguments is often shaky. Discovering a brain correlate, or any other cause
of an action, does not mean that it is not an action. If actions exist, they
have causes, including those arising in the brain.
278 See, e.g., JOHN S. SEARLE, MIND: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 88-92, 111-32 (2004)

[hereinafter SEARLE, MIND]; Galen Strawson, Consciousness, Free Will, and the
Unimportance of Determinism, 32 INQUIRY 3 (1989) (claiming that reductive physicalism
about the mind is "moonshine"); see generally JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE
MIND (1992) (providing an extended argument for the irreducible reality of mind)
[hereinafter SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND].
279 PAUL MCHUGH & PHILIP SLAVNEY, THE PERSPECTIVES OF PSYCHIATRY 11-12 (2d ed.

1998); see also CARL F. CRAVER, EXPLAINING THE BRAIN: MECHANISMS AND THE MOSAIC
UNITY OF NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2007) ("[O]ne frequently finds claims that neuroscientists are on

the verge of explaining the mysteries of consciousness, the illusion of free will, the frailty of
human memory, and the nature of the self. If neuroscience succeeds in these explanatory
goals, it will revise our self-conception as radically as Copernicus' decentering of the earth
and Darwin's humbling vision of our origins.")
280 To claim that mental states may play a causal role in behavior does not commit one to
discredited mind-brain dualism. Even if mental states cannot be reduced to brain states at
the level of neurons, the mind is produced by and realizable in the brain, a position that may
be termed "non-reductive monism" or biological naturalism. See SEARLE, MIND, supra note
278, at 113-14. It is an almost inevitable feature of language to sound dualistic, however.
For example, when critics of dualism talk about "my" or "your brain" they imply that there
is a "me" or a "you," a self that is distinguishable from one's brain. Imagine expressing that
thought by talking about "the brain that is inside this skull [pointing to one's own head or the
head of another]."
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The real NAT question is whether scientific experiments have shown
that action is rare or non-existent, that conscious will is largely or entirely
an illusion after all. Four kinds of evidence are often adduced: first,
demonstrations that a very large part of our activity is undeniably caused by
variables of which we are not at all aware; second, studies indicating that
more activity than we think takes place when our consciousness is divided
or diminished; third, laboratory studies that show that people can be
experimentally misled about their causal contribution to their apparent
behavior; and fourth, evidence that particular types of psychological
processes seem to have their biological substrate in specific regions of the
brain. None of these kinds of evidence offers logical support to NAT.
Just because a person may not be aware of all the causes for why he or
she formed an intention does not mean that the person did not form an
intention and was not a fully conscious agent when he did so. Even if
human beings were never aware of the causes of their intentions to act and
of their actions, it would not necessarily follow that they were not acting
consciously, intentionally, and for reasons that make eminent sense to
anyone under the circumstances.
Human consciousness can undeniably be divided or diminished by a
wide variety of normal and abnormal causes. 28 1 We have known this long
before contemporary scientific discoveries of what causes such states and
how they correlate with brain structure and processes. Law and morality
agree that if an agent's capacity for consciousness is non-culpably
diminished, responsibility is likewise diminished. As we have seen,282
some suggest that it is diminished because bodily movements in the absence
of fully integrated consciousness are not "actions." Others believe that
apparently goal-directed behavior that is responsive to the environment,
such as sleepwalking, is action, but that it should be excused because
diminished consciousness reduces the capacity for rationality. Let us
assume that the former view is correct because it offers more direct support
to NAT, and therefore the greatest challenge to traditional notions of
individual responsibility. Let us also assume that divided or diminished
consciousness is more common than we think. Nevertheless, neither of
these assumptions supports the more radical, general NAT thesis.
To demonstrate that divided or partial consciousness is more common
than it appears certainly extends the range of cases in which people are not
responsible or have diminished responsibility, but such studies do not
281 See

JEFFREY

L.

CUMMINGS

& MICHAEL S.

MEGA,

NEUROSPSYCHIATRY

AND

(description of dissociative and related states
and their causes and treatments); D. Vaitl et al., Psychobiology of Altered States of
Consciousness, 131 PSYCHOL. BULL. 98 (2005).
BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 333-43 (2003)

282 See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
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demonstrate that most human bodily movements that appear intentional and
rational occur when the person has altered consciousness. One cannot
generalize to all human behavior from genuinely deviant cases or cases in
which a known abnormality is present. A model of action (or, we should
say, non-action) built on sleepwalking, for example, is hardly a threat to
orthodox notions of individual responsibility.
There is substantial empirical evidence to suggest that experimental
laboratory manipulations of unsuspecting subjects can cause the subjects to
believe that their intentions were producing action when this was not the
case. 283 That subjects can be cleverly misled to misunderstand the causal
role of their intentionality by experimental manipulations hardly indicates
that intentions generally play no role in explaining our behavior. The brain
and other material variables may cause our behavior, but not because such
variables are intentional manipulators.28 4
Finally, there is accumulating evidence that various psychological
processes have their biological substrates in localized regions of the brain.
We have long known that many behavioral activities were biologically
based in highly specific regions. For example, specific areas in the brain
are necessary to produce expressive speech fully. If they are lesioned, the
subject becomes aphasic and will not be able to produce more than simple
sentences. 2885 For another example, the ability to recognize faces is highly
localized in a region of the temporal lobe of the right hemisphere referred to
as the "fusiform face area." In the unusual cases in which this area is
lesioned, the subject loses the ability to recognize faces, a condition called
prosopagnosia. 286 Now, however, functional neuroimaging techniques that
permit the exploration of brain activity during more complicated
psychological processes can identify biological substrates for such
processes.
For example, specific brain regions are associated with
decisions to purchase an object. 287 For another example, a recent study
demonstrated that investigators could determine from the region of brain

283 See John A. Bargh, Bypassing the Will: Toward Demystifying the Nonconscious
Control of Social Behavior, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS, supra note 271, at 37 (reviewing the

evidence and concluding that the "will" is not primarily responsible for action).
284 DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING

8-9 (1984) (explaining in the related context of the determinist critique that determinism
does not mean that a "nefarious neurosurgeon" is controlling your behavior).
285 ANNA BASSO, APAHASIA AND ITS THERAPY 30-31 (2003).
286 James W. Tanaka, Object Categorization, Expertise, and Neural Plasticity, in
THE
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES III 877, 883 (Michael S. Gazzaniga ed., MIT Press 3d ed. 2004).
287 See Knutson et al., supra note 268.
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activity which activity-adding or subtracting-a subject had covertly
intended to perform but had not yet performed.288
The localization evidence is immensely interesting and suggestive, but
none of it indicates that mental states play no role in causally explaining
behavior. There must be a biological substrate in the brain for all human
behavior. If your brain is dead, you are dead and not behaving at all. Nor
is it surprising that particular regions of the brain are associated with
particular psychological processes.
For example, a leading, albeit
controversial, theory of how the mind works suggests that it is composed of
different systems that perform different functions. 289 Although we do not
know how the brain enables the mind, it makes sense to assume that
specific psychological processes would have brain substrates specific to the
process in question. Based on what we already knew about localization and
based on the entirely reasonable assumption that it would be inefficient if
all regions of the brain needed to be equally activated to support any
psychological process, localization is most likely to be true generally. Even
if all this is true, however, it does not follow that mental states do no causal
explanatory work. It demonstrates at most that the neural network
substrates for specific mental functions may be localizable to specific
regions of the brain.
What is needed to support NAT is a general demonstration that causal
intentionality is an illusion, but no such general demonstration has yet been
produced by scientific study. The most interesting evidence has arisen from
studies done by neuroscientist Benjamin Libet, 290 which have generated an
immense amount of comment.29' Indeed, many claim that Libet's work is

288 John-Dylan

Haynes et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain, 17

CURRENT BIOLOGY 323 (2007). It is important to recognize that the brain activity accurately
predicted only which type of process the subject had covertly formed the intention to
perform. It did not identify the specific content of the intention, such as which two numbers
the subject intended to add or subtract. Despite the enormous advances in cognitive
neuroscience, we do not know how to read minds using neuroimaging or any other
technique. Cf Martha J. Farah, Bioethical Issues in the Cognitive Sciences, in THE
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES III, supra note 286, at 1309-10 (referring to the ability to
identify traits and states as "a crude form of mindreading").
289

E.g., JERRY FODOR, THE MODULARITY OF MIND (1983) (providing a strict modular

theory).
290

Benjamin Libet, Do We Have Free Will, in THE VOLITIONAL BRAIN: TOWARDS A

NEUROSCIENCE OF FREE WILL 47 (Benjamin Libet et al. eds., 1999) (summarizing the
findings and speculating about their implications).
291 WEGNER, supra note 269, at 54-55 (characterizing the recounting of Libet's results as
a "cottage industry" and noting the large and contentious body of commentary).
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the first direct neurophysiological evidence of NAT.292
Libet's
exceptionally creative and careful studies demonstrate that measurable
electrical brain activity associated with intentional actions occurs in the
relevant motor areas of the brain about 550 milliseconds before the subject
actually acts and about 350-400 milliseconds before the subject is
consciously aware of the intention to act.
Let us assume, with cautious reservations, 293 the validity of these
studies. The crucial question then becomes whether the interpretation of
these findings as supporting NAT is valid. It does not follow from this
temporal ordering that conscious intentionality does no causal work. It
simply demonstrates that non-conscious brain events precede conscious
experience. Although we have no idea how the brain enables the mind, this
seems precisely what one would expect of the mind-brain.
All
psychological processes, including conscious intentionality, must begin
with brain activity because the mind is realized in the brain. Electrical
impulses move quickly along neural pathways, but some lag between brain
activity and conscious experience seems unsurprising. Electrical activity in
the brain is precisely that: electrical activity in the brain and not a mental
state such as a decision or intention. A readiness potential is not a decision.
Prior electrical activity does not mean that conscious intentionality played
no causal role.
Libet does not carefully distinguish between urges or wants on the one
hand and decisions and intentions on the other.294 Indeed, Alfred Mele
argues that the experimental evidence is much more consistent with a
readiness potential being associated with an urge rather than with an
intention or decision.29 5 A perfectly plausible reading of Libet's work is
that various non-conscious causal variables, including non-conscious urges,
precede action, but that intentionality is nonetheless necessary for action.
Libet also claims that subjects can "veto" the act during the delay
between becoming aware of the intention and performing the intended
action. He surprisingly conceives of this "veto" as an undetermined act.
Other researchers appear to have localized the part of the brain that is the
292 William P. Banks & Susan Pockett, Benjamin Libet's Work on the Neuroscience of

Free Will, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO CONSCIOUSNESS 657, 658 (Max Velmans &

Susan Schneider eds., 2007).
293 E.g., HENRIK

WALTER,

NEUROPHILOSOPHY

OF FREE WILL:

FROM LIBERTARIAN

ILLUSIONS TO A CONCEPT OF NEURAL ANATOMY 250-52 (Cynthia Klor trans., 2001) (2001);
Jing Zhu, Reclaiming Volition: An Alternative Interpretation of Libet's Experiment, 10 J.
CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 61 (2003).
294 ALFRED R. MELE, FREE WILL AND LUCK 33 (2006); see also M.R. BENNETT & P.M.S.

HACKER, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE 228-31 (2003) (criticizing Libet's

account of action).

295 MELE, supra note 294, at 33, 40.
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substrate for this activity of vetoing.29 6 In addition to the implausibility of
the veto being undetermined,2 97 the conceptual foundation of the
interpretation that the subjects were exercising a genuine veto is shaky at
best. 298 This suggestion of an undetermined veto undermines the claim that
the brain is doing all the work because it is apparently a newly formed
intention to veto that causes the agent not to perform the act. In short,
Libet's work presupposes agency at every step in the process.
Finally, Libet's task involved "random" finger movements that
involved no deliberation whatsoever and no rational motivation for the
specific movements involved. 299 This is a far cry from the type of
intentional conduct that is the criminal law's concern. The commands of
the criminal law address intentional actions or omissions in contexts in
which there is always good reason to refrain from harming another or to act
beneficently. At present, it is an open question whether Libet's paradigm is
representative of intentional action in general because the experiments
involved such trivial behavior.3 °0
Libet's work is fascinating, but it does not provide a general proof that
humans are never or infrequently conscious, intentional agents, or that they
are not capable of employing their conscious intentionality when they have
good reason to do so, or that these intentions play no causal role. 30 1 Even if
Libet's work is methodologically valid, as we have assumed, various
conceptual and interpretive arguments massively undermine the claim that
Libet has demonstrated that NAT is true.
Moreover, NAT provides no guidance about what we should do next
and, in any event, degenerates into a self-referential incoherence. Let us
suppose that you were convinced by the mechanistic view that you were not
an intentional, rational agent after all. (Of course, the notion of being
convinced would be an illusion, too.) What should you do now? You
know it is an illusion to think that your deliberations and intentions have
any causal efficacy in the world. You also know, however, that you
experience sensations such as pleasure and pain and that you care about
what happens to you and to the world. You cannot just sit quietly and wait
296

Marcel Brass & Patrick Haggard, To Do or Not to Do: The Neural Signature of Self-

Control, 27 J. NEUROSCIENCE 9141, 9141-45 (2007).
297 Banks & Pockett, supra note 292, at 667.
298 MELE, supra note 294, at 34-35.
299 Participating in the study and cooperating with the investigator can be rationally
motivated, of course. But the experimental task was to move one's finger randomly and thus
for no good reason.
300 Banks & Pockett, supra note 292, at 662-63.
301 See Jerry Fodor, Making the Connection, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, May 17,
2002, at 4 (arguing that the new neuroscience rarely has much to contribute when the
phenomenon in question is complex social behavior).
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for your neurotransmitters to fire. You must and will, of course, deliberate
and act.
That is, even if pure mechanism is true-about which, once again, we
will never be certain until we solve the mind-body problem-human beings
will find it almost impossible not to treat themselves as rational, intentional
agents unless there are major changes in the way our brains work. Indeed,
as we discuss below, there are powerful evolutionary explanations for the
causal efficacy of our mental states, states that are the predicates for
responsibility. 30 2 Overcoming what may in fact be neuro-architectural facts
of evolution may be only a little less likely than "overcoming" our
opposable thumbs.30 3 Moreover, as we saw, if you use the truth of pure
mechanism as a premise in deciding what to do, this premise will entail no
particular moral, legal, or political conclusions. It will provide no guide to
how one should live, including how one should respond to the truth of
NAT.
Finally, the argument from common sense in favor of the justified
belief that we are conscious, intentional creatures is overwhelming.
Consider again, for example, the nature of law itself. As we have seen, law
is a system of rules that at the least is meant to guide or influence behavior
and thus to operate as a potential cause of behavior. It would be impossible
at present for us to abandon the well-justified belief that action may be
influenced by reason and that our intentions are causally efficacious. As the
eminent philosopher of mind Jerry Fodor wrote:
[I]f commonsense intentional psychology were really to collapse, that would be,

beyond comparison, the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of our species;
if we're that wrong about the mind, then that's the wrongest we've ever been about
anything.
The collapse of the supernatural,
for example, doesn't
compare .... Nothing except, perhaps, our commonsense physics.., comes as near
our cognitive core as intentional explanation does. We'll be in deep, deep trouble3 if
4
we have to give it up .... But be of good cheer; everything is going to be all right. 0

The new neuroscience does not pose, and is unlikely ever to pose, a
real threat to our fundamental conception of personhood and all that follows
from it, including the concept of responsibility and related concepts, such as
302
303

See infra text accompanying note 306.
See infra text accompanying note 311.

304 JERRY FODOR, PSYCHOSEMANTICS: THE PROBLEM OF MEANING IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF

MIND xii (1987). The entire book is a defense of common sense intentional explanation. See
generally BERTRAM F. MALLE, HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR: FOLK EXPLANATIONS,
MEANING AND SOCIAL INTERACTION (2004) (providing a full theoretical account and

empirical support). There is also growing recognition within psychology that "mental state
inference is one of the most fundamental tools of social cognition." Bertram F. Malle, Folk
Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundationsof Human Cognition, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS,
supra note 271, at 225, 229.
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mens rea. At the very least, we remain entitled to presume that conscious
intentions are potentially rational and causal and to place the burden of
persuasion at a very high level on proponents of NAT. At present, the case
is not close to meeting the burden. We are frilly entitled to continue to
believe that we are the sorts of creatures we believe ourselves to be.
B. THE ROOTS OF RESPONSIBILITY

If the sciences have not yet shown that individual responsibility is an
unjustified illusion, where does it come from? Might those roots provide a
useful guide to what the criteria should be for holding each other
responsible?
In this Part, we consider newer philosophical and
neuroscientific approaches to this age-old question.
One of the most influential modem philosophical theories of
responsibility, beginning with a classic article by P.F. Strawson 30 5 and
expanded by many others,3 °6 argues that responsibility is rooted in our
reactive emotions, such as indignation, resentment, anger, and gratitude.
When we are benefited or harmed by compliance with or breach of a
normative obligation, we tend to have such reactive emotions. Nonetheless,
we think that such reactions are justified only if the agent acted with the
right mental state and was responsible. If the agent was not responsible, we
may continue to have a reactive emotion, but on reflection would concede
that it is not justified. Further, if we think that our reactive attitude is
justified, we also think that we are justified in expressing that attitude in an
appropriate way. This process can occur publicly or privately, as personal
moral criticism or criminal law blame and punishment, for example. To
hold someone responsible, then, is to believe that one is justified in having
and expressing a reactive attitude. In criminal responsibility terms, holding
responsible means that we believe we are justified in blaming and punishing
wrongdoers. Blaming in this context means more than simply grading. It
refers to a moral evaluation of the criminal's conduct.3 °7
Although the content of the normative obligations and the specific
reactive emotions and expressions might vary temporally or culturally, it is
probably true that all cultures have responsibility practices that bear some
resemblance to this account. It is certainly the case in Western systems of
morality and law. It is also striking that there is enormous agreement,
including cross-culturally, about the rank ordering of the seriousness of the

305
306

P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREE WILL 59 (Gary Watson ed., 1982).
See, e.g., R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS (1994).

307 HILARY

BOK, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 35-39 (1998).
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30 8
harms to persons and property that are at the core of the criminal law,
although much less agreement about the appropriate penalty structure.
There is a deep explanation of the ubiquity of the reactive emotions
themselves that is coming primarily from the sciences-from evolutionary
biology, evolutionary psychology and, indeed, even from neuroscience
itself. In fact, Strawson predicted some of these results, asserting that the
reactive attitudes were part of human nature, and that it would be
impossible to obliterate them, and undesirable to do so even if we somehow
could. 30 9 Having biological roots of course does not guarantee that a
practice is normatively desirable. 310 To believe otherwise is the naturalistic
fallacy, but if a practice has biological roots, biology can indicate the
"price" for abandoning it.
Evolutionary theorists have demonstrated with game-theoretic
precision that many otherwise confounding animal behaviors, including
some human behaviors, are perfectly adaptive; they are widespread because
they provided individual actors with survival advantage, reproductive
advantage, or both.3 1' It is now settled that all animals, including humans,
have evolved tendencies to act in certain predictable ways under certain
conditions.
We believe that this sort of evolutionary account is the best
explanation of the ubiquity of reactive responsibility practices and of the
powerful agreement about ordinal harm rankings.
There is good
experimental evidence to suggest, for example, that homo sapiens are
predisposed to be altruistic retributivists.31 2 A more recent experimental

308 Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance & Conflict in Intuitions of
Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007) (people's intuitions of justice concerning the core
harms of the criminal law are specific, nuanced, and widely shared cross-culturally).
309 See also P.F. STRAWSON, SKEPTICISM AND NATURALISM: SOME VARIETIES 35-37
(1983). Later commentators have differed about a seemingly naturalized account of the
reactive emotions theory of responsibility. Compare GEORGE SHER, IN PRAISE OF BLAME 1

(2005) (criticizing Strawson), with Andrew Oldenquist, An Explanation of Retribution, 85 J.
PHIL. 464 (1988) (arguing for a naturalized account of retribution).
310 See BOK, supra note 307, at 26-27.
311 See, e.g., W.D. Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior, 7 J.
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 1, 1-52 (1964); Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal

Altruism, 46 Q. REv. BIOL., Mar. 1971, at 35-37 (1971).
312 See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gdchter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE 137,
137 (2002) (finding that experimental evidence suggests human beings have evolved to
engage in nonutilitarian, "altruistic" punishment when members of their social group
"defect" by violating a normative expectation). More recent, consistent evidence suggests
that, at least in men (who do most of the punishing for free riding), empathic responses are
shaped positively by fair treatment by others and negatively by unfair treatment. Tania
Singer et al., Empathic Neural Responses Are Modulated by the Perceived Fairness of
Others, 439 NATURE 466 (2006). Other cooperative primates exhibit behavior best
interpreted as expressing resentment when they perceive that they are treated undeservedly
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study demonstrates that societies with an altruistic punishment mechanism
have a competitive advantage compared with a rival society without one.
Although subjects initially prefer the society without punishment, they
quickly migrate to the sanctioning society because greater social
cooperation occurs in the latter. 313 All these findings are consistent with an
human societies enforced
evolutionary account of how successful
314
riding.
free
to
response
their
by
cooperation
Punishing free-riders is only part of the evolutionary story. We have
adaptive proclivities to free-ride, but we also have adaptive proclivities to
cooperate. As a profoundly social species, it takes no great leap of
imagination to understand that our ancestors would have been much less
successful, and therefore much less likely to be our ancestors, if they were
unable to understand the intentions of others, not sure they could convert
their intentions into action, and not equipped with powerful assumptions
that that stranger coming over the hill is equipped with the same capacity
for harmful intentions as they are.315 Moreover, evolution has equipped us
with an advanced and sensitive system to modulate short-term individual
benefits (steal that car) against long-term individual costs (go to prison),
and vice versa. They are two sides of the same evolutionary coin, and,
inflamed with that sometimes cursed and almost-ever-present
consciousness, they are the heart of the human dilemma and at the heart of
law and morality.
Of course, holding people responsible and giving them their just
deserts is clearly a complex social practice that is inevitably and powerfully
affected by culture and individual learning and socialization. Blaming and
unequally. See Sarah F. Brosnan & Frans B.M. de Waal, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, 425
NATURE 297, 297 (2003); see generally PAUL W. GLIMCHER, DECISIONS, UNCERTAINTY AND
THE BRAIN: THE SCIENCE OF NEUROECONOMICS (2003).
313 Ozgur Gurerk, Bernd Irlenbusch & Bettina Rockenbach, The Competitive Advantage
of SanctioningInstitutions, 312 SCIENCE 108 (2006).
314 DAVID M. Buss, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE MIND 27677 (2d ed. 2004); STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN

NATURE 180-82 (2002). Indeed, that irrepressible sense of freedom of action and
"personhood" that we have already discussed in philosophical and legal contexts is most
likely irrepressible because our brains evolved to experience and construct that sense of
freedom and personhood. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman & Timothy H. Goldsmith, The
BiologicalRoots of Punishment, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 627 (2004).
315 See Justin N. Wood et al., The Perception of Rational, Goal-Directed Action in
Nonhuman Primates, 317 SCIENCE 1402, 1405 (2007) (demonstrating that the ability to
understand the intentions of other creatures evolved in primates 40 million years ago); see
also Esther Herrmann et al., Humans Have Developed Specialized Skills of Social Cognition:
The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis, 317 SCIENCE 1360 (2007) (comparing chimpanzees
and orangutans to two-and-a-half-year-old humans and discovering that they have
approximately equal cognitive skills concerning the physical world, but that humans have
superior cognitive skills for understanding social interaction).
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punishing are not solely the product of our DNA or our neuro-architecture.
There is no single punishment gene or neural network. Nonetheless, we
seem strongly predisposed to feel and to express retributive sentiments, a
predisposition that might not be so easy to overcome, even it were
normatively a good idea to do so.
As we have suggested previously, holding certain people responsible
and excusing others is profoundly normatively desirable. It takes people
seriously as potentially moral agents and contributes to human dignity and
respect. It also facilitates social cooperation. We would be giving up much
that is worthwhile if we abandoned the practice of responsibility merely to
be consistent with an allegedly clear-eyed and scientific view that no one
should be blamed and punished and that we should be concerned solely
with the consequences of social control. An irrationality excuse, like the
insanity defense, may ultimately not be of much benefit in terms of social
safety, but it is crucial to taking responsibility seriously.
VII. MENS REA, LEGAL INSANITY, AND COMMON SENSE

The moral (pardon the expression) of our story is that the criminal law
must continue to emphasize the importance of mens rea and rationality, and
that deciding whether a defendant lacks mens rea or is sufficiently irrational
to be excused are factual and moral decisions that may safely be left to the
common sense of ordinary people.
There will still be interpretive questions, of course. Consider the
following cases of potential legal insanity:
(1) The delusional self-defender who actually believes that he is in
imminent wrongful danger of death.
(2) Daniel M'Naghten, who is equally deluded about the danger to his
life, but does not believe that his death is imminently threatened by the
victim.
(3) A person who hallucinates that she heard God's voice command
her to kill her children and delusionally believes that she must obey in order
to produce eternal peace on earth.
(4) Andrea Yates, who believes that she must kill her children now to
save them from Satan's eternal torments.
(5) A person who delusionally believes his spouse is unfaithful despite
having no objective evidence of this whatsoever and kills her in a state of
jealous rage sparked by his delusional belief.
(6) The psychopath: a person who knows what he is doing and knows
the "prices," such as going to prison, for failing to comply with certain
rules, but who entirely lacks conscience and empathy and does not get the
point of morality or its rules at all.
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The first five defendants are equally deluded and equally irrational, but
all meet the elements of the prima facie case because all are at least
arguably capable of forming the required mens rea. The psychopath clearly
has no problem forming mens rea, so only legal insanity is in question. Yet
there is no obvious right answer to these cases under any insanity defense
rule. Indeed, the authors of this paper disagree about some of them.
If the question is simply whether the practical reason resulting in the
crime was substantially affected by irrationality, then the first five should
all be acquitted by reason of insanity. The case of the delusionally jealous
person is arguably distinguishable because no plausible theory of
justification or mitigation would apply even if the facts were true. There is
some merit to this distinction (and most insanity tests would not acquit this
defendant), but it is not self-evident. After all, the fundamental premise of
the agent's practical reason was delusional and uncorrectable. Quite
simply, the agent is not rational even though his general moral compass
may be intact. One might well want to acquit such a person.
Indeed, the Privy Council recently decided a case involving a
structurally similar set of facts.3 16 Defendants were Rastafarians who
entered a Roman Catholic church on Santa Lucia, attacked the congregants,
tried to bum the church and churchgoers, and killed a nun and the priest
who had intervened.3 17 Defendants claimed they acted in response to their
Rastafarian beliefs and to hearing voices, and that the attack was politically
motivated.' 8 Expert evidence suggested that although Rastafarian beliefs
are hostile to Roman Catholicism, these defendants were delusional.319
The question on appeal was how properly to construe the Santa Lucia
Criminal Code's insanity provisions. 320 The insanity defense had two
prongs. The first was a standard M'Naghten rule. The second excused the
defendant:
[l]f he did the act.., under the influence of a delusion of such a nature as to render
him, in the opinion of the lury
or of the Court, an unfit subject for punishment of any
kind in respect of such act.

The issue was whether the second prong was an independent test or
whether the delusional state had to satisfy the standard strictures of
M'Naghten.322 The defendants clearly knew in a narrow sense what they
316 Phillip v. Queen, (2007) 2007 WL 1243180 (C.A. Eastern Ct. of Justice).
317 Id.

at paragraph 2.
318 Id. at paragraph 6.
319 Id. at paragraphs 10, 12.
320 Id. at paragraph 17.
321 Id. at paragraph 4.
322 Id. at paragraph 17.
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were doing and knew it was unlawful; they would not have been justified
even if the dreadful social conditions that motivated them were true. Thus,
unless a sufficient delusion alone would be reason to acquit, they had to be
convicted. 23
The Privy Council decided on both historical and normative grounds
that the delusional prong was an independent test that was meant to broaden
the insanity defense beyond M'Naghten's bounds.324 Conceding that it was
difficult to determine when a delusion alone would render a defendant unfit
for punishment, it suggested that if a defendant were impelled or persuaded
by delusional beliefs to commit deeds he knew were forbidden, then
deterrence would fail and "the object of retribution would be repugnant to
the conscience of the ordinary citizen.,,325 In short, the Privy Council
accepted an expansive reading of the Santa Lucia statute that permitted
acquittal by reason if insanity if the defendant's rationality were sufficiently
undermined by mental abnormality, even if the defendant knew what he
was doing and knew that it was wrong. Whether this result is morally and
socially desirable is open to debate, but it is a merciful standard that is
morally, intellectually, and socially plausible.32 6
Suppose, instead, the test is whether the defendant acted for a good
327
justifying reason under positive law if the deluded reasons were true.
Even then, some of these cases are close, including (3) and (4). In the
latter, would the general justification of necessity or "balance of evils"
apply if the belief were true? Is this even a sensible way to put the
question? Finally, disposition of the sixth case depends entirely on how one
defines rationality for purposes of ascribing responsibility. These are
people who know what they are doing and know the rules but who simply
do not understand the difference between good and evil. Are they irrational
or simply bad?
In the end, reasonably crafted definitions of mens rea and insanity,
coupled with the common sense of jurors, should be sufficient to create
systems of responsibility robust enough to reflect a strong presumption of
blameworthiness, yet sensitive enough to recognize the rare exception.

323

The defendants in Phillip were not morally identical to the delusionally jealous killer

because the former thought they were politically and morally justified. Nevertheless, in
neither case would the defendants be acquitted if the facts they believed were true.
324 Id. at paragraph 21.
325 Id. at paragraph 24.
326 Author Morse is attracted to but ambivalent about this test. See Morse, supra note
247. Author Hoffman agrees that it is plausible, but believes it is a dreadful test.
327 This alternative is quite akin to the "justification" part of the integrationist approach
discussed supra at note 250 and accompanying text, but in this case the excuse is explicitly
tied to the agent's irrationality and no general subjectivization of justifications is necessary.
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Indeed, jurors alone, with available information concerning mens rea and
excusing doctrines but with no other guidance about the details of those
doctrines seem perfectly competent to make such judgments.328
There is good evidence to suggest that the language of the insanity
defense does not make a great deal of difference to the outcome of insanity
cases. 329 Jurors apparently reach a rather "rough and ready" judgment
about which offenders deserve to be excused. Not surprisingly, the major
variable that affects the outcome is the severity of the offender's disorderthat is, how grossly out of touch with reality the defendant was. 330 Nonpsychotic offenders seldom succeed, which is the intuitive moral result,
since, as we have discussed, most non-psychotic people are not sufficiently
irrational to deserve an excuse.331
In sum, we can apparently trust the good judgment of juries in most
insanity cases. We cannot and should not expect more.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Clark reached the right result on legal insanity but the wrong result on
mens rea, and, in doing so, perpetuated the blurring of the two. Stout, but
clearly separate, doctrines of intentionality and excuse will help jurors use
their common sense about both. That will in turn help ensure results that
mesh with our most fundamental notions of individual responsibility and
blameworthiness. For now, desirable concepts of responsibility and blame
are not undermined by the newest scientific findings about behavior.

328 RITA J.

SIMON & DAVID

E.

AARONSON,

THE INSANITY

DEFENSE:

A CRITICAL

ASSESSMENT OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-HNCKLEY ERA 113-35 (1988) (jurors could

fairly and sensibly apply the law).

329 HENRY M. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY

DEFENSE REFORM 61-62 (1993). Changes in the burden of persuasion were more effective.
Id. at 142-43.
330 Id. at 31.
331There is great behavioral heterogeneity among people with psychotic disorders, so not
all of them should be excused, even if their psychotic processes played a role in their
practical reason. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 50, at xxix.
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